Leonidas Leonidou’s and Fanoulla Argyrou’s comments to Mr. William Maillinson’s response of 28 August 2024.

https://simerini.sigmalive.com/article/2024/8/28/response-to-fanoulla-argyrous-article-of-30-july/

We will not indulge in similar demeaning adjectives as those Mr. Mallinson used against Argyrou and Leonidou for scrutinising his essay on the tragedy of our own native country.

Our comments on his article and conclusions are based on facts derived from the British National Archives (BNA) and other primary sources and documents following decades of research.

British policy over Cyprus

A vast amount of evidence, in the BNA proves the British Government’s collusion with the Government of Turkey in defining the policy on Cyprus since 1955. Some examples are:

1) The deliberate Tripartite Conference in London at the end of August 1955 organised by Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick with the sole objective of facilitating Turkey’s interest and involvement in the Cyprus issue, in gross violation of the Treaty of Lausanne.

2) The British Government’s instruction to Cyprus Government House in 1956 to prepare different partition plans for Cyprus (repeated in 1957). Although these did not materialise due to the USA State Department’s disagreement in 1957, the long term objective of partition was seeded.

3) Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick had also drawn his own partition plan –hence the infamous “Kirkpatrick line” – in addition to those received from Government House in Nicosia. These are indisputable facts illustrated in the released documents in the British National Archives.

4) Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick on the 26.6.1955 (two months before the Tripartite Conference) had written: “I have always been attracted by a 3 Power Conference, simply because I believe that it would seriously embarrass the Greek Government”.

Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick soon after in an internal memo dated 31.5.1956 also admitted that it was he who first aired the partition of Cyprus.

5) Encouraged by the British attitude, in November 1956 Dr. Nihat Erim delivered his plan/strategy to his Prime Minister Adnan Menderes on how to “recapture” Cyprus.

6) As a result of secret British/Turkish collaborations the then Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd, on the 19th December 1956, stated in the House of Commons that self-determination to a minority of 18% Turks in Cyprus and partition would not be excluded in a final solution. (That statement was agreed between the Colonial Secretary and the Turkish Government in Constantinople on 16 December 1956). That secret arrangement was in line with Dr. Erim’s planning.

Lennox-Boyd stated:

“When the time comes for this review — that is, when these conditions have been fulfilled— it will be the purpose of Her Majesty’s Government to ensure that any exercise of self-determination should be effected in such a manner that the Turkish Cypriot community no less than the Greek Cypriot community shall, in the special circumstances of Cyprus, be given freedom to decide for themselves their future status. In other words, Her Majesty’s Government recognise that the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed population must include partition among the eventual options”.[1]

Spaak/NATO rejection of Turkish partition demands

Not only the partition plans were rejected in 1957 by the State Department but also in January 1958 by NATO chief Paul Henry Spaak. When he was informed by the British Representative of the Turkish demands for partition, he found them “remarkably unreasonable and unconstructive. In general, he took a serious view of Turkish Intransigence which seemed to be growing worse. It was also obvious that the Turks had made no proper attempt to think out the implications of partition. The time was surely past in the West when populations could be uprooted and the economy of a country upset as they certainly would be if partition was imposed. In this connexion the Turks had apparently not progressed beyond a Balkan war mentality…”

One could equally find “naïve balderdash” the claim that just because USA insisted that Makarios was released from the Seychelles, this meant that the USA defined the British policy over Cyprus!

Mr. Mallinson’s conclusion “this explains poignantly why British policy on Cyprus, and indeed the Middle East, is essentially American, and why Kissinger’s introduction of the ‘BBF’ continues to bedevil the situation…” implying that Kissinger introduced the Bicommunal Bizonal Federation (BBF) is unsupported.

Mr.Mallinson’s position that everything over Cyprus evolved around NATO and Dr. Henry Kissinger, cannot be substantiated. The situation continues to bedevilled because of the British Foreign Office policy on Cyprus since 1955. Kissinger never introduced the BBF (Bicommunal, Bizonal Federation). That is a myth. The origins of BBF were seeded in London in collaboration with the Turkish Government long before Dr. Kissinger appeared in the State Department.

Furthermore:

Following the 19 December 1956 statement in the House of Commons –

1) The Turks moved forward in 1957 and demanded TWO ZONES, regarded by the British as confederation. (Adding the bizonality to the bicommunialism of 19/12/56).

2) In January 1958 the Foreign Office informed American Secretary Dulles that they could not abandon partition because of promises they had made to the Turks.

3) At the same time the British told Dr Nihat Erim that the international community would not accept partition and he had to be satisfied with what they would be able to give him and be patient until more favourable times… They then began studying Federal solutions for Cyprus.

4) Thus the Zurich and London Agreements were devised offering over privileges to a minority of 18%…

5) Hence 4.10.1958 the British Ambassador in Athens wrote “if we cannot say that we do not intend that our plan should of itself lead to partition, it would be logical to assume that this is because we think it likely that it will of its nature create conditions leading to partition…”

6) In January 1964 the Foreign Office began studying the reconstruction of the RoC into a geographical federation in two constituent states one Greek and one Turkish.

7) Raouf Denktash on 16.1.1964 at the London Conference demanded geographical federation with population movement…

8) On 14.2.1964, Sir Crispin Tickell drew the plan for the “Future of Cyprus” looking 10 years ahead and how they would achieve it…

9) On 28.2.1964, the Turkish Foreign Minister told the F.O that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots wanted one thing and one thing only, geographical separation.

10) On 13.4.1964 the T/Cypriot community prepared proposals for a Federal Republic with two regional governments (geographical federation)

11) In February 1974 Bulent Ecevit demanded a geographical federation.

12) On 10.7.1974 the Government of Cyprus delivered a note to the Foreign Office rejecting a geographical federation as per Ecevit’s demand.

13) During the meeting of 17 July 1974 at 10 Downing Street, between Harold Wilson’s Government and the Turkish PM Ecevit although the former rejected proposals for joint invasion, the British Foreign Secretary promised to stop Greek help to Cyprus if Turks went ahead with their plan.

14) James Callaghan in Geneva II pressured Mavros and Clerides to accept geographical federation.

15) On 16 August 1974 Alan Goodison in the F.O decided: The solution would be bi-regional federation and favoured Glafcos Clerides for phase 3 as he wrote: “The chances of a radical settlement in Cyprus depend on having Glerides rather than Makarios at stage III. The Secretary of State has already embarrassed Makarios by moving him towards stating his terms before we resume in Geneva; this line could perhaps be developed to Glerides’ benefit…The only solution that can emerge is of a federal state. A solution based on geographical federation…this will be the best solution for us… We believe bi-regional federation in Cyprus on the lines Denktash wants is the best solution…”

[1] Link to Hansard page: https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1956-12-19/debates/44585f12-8d3a-4872-94d8-46e78f235100/Cyprus

As James Callaghan needed the support of the Americans to implement the British solution he dispatched his top team to Washington to secure it. (The meeting of 27 August 1974 confirms). When Kissinger interjected that the great diplomatic feat had already been achieved by casting him as the villain of their negotiations, the British response was that Callaghan deliberately maintained a low profile…. Kissinger was asked for his support for their (British solution of BBF). He gave it the next day after consulting his President.

16) According to Foreign office archives, it was Kissinger who referred to Makarios as “a Turkish stooge” on 18 July 1974- transmitted to Callaghan by Ambassador Ramsbotham. Makarios did give his “consent” to Callaghan on 17 July 1974 to work with the Turks knowing full well of the Turkish decision to invade but with the false belief Ecevit would re-instate him as President ignoring the bloody results that would entail.

17) The British Government had studied the possibility of intervening with troops, (we have studied those documents too) albeit they had no intention of doing so, explicitly revealed in numerous documents. Their non-intervention was decided as far back as December 1963 when the then PM informed the Commonwealth Secretary to bear in mind that even if Turkey invaded they had no intention of intervening. They repeated that decision in 1972 to the then High Commissioner in Cyprus and actioned it on 20th July 1974 and 14 August 1974.

18) James Callaghan did tell the Committee the truth and it had nothing to do with the Americans. The Select Committee apparently chose not to include it. Here is the evidence, the relevant extract from Callaghan himself, 25/2/1976 to Nicosia, Athens and Ankara.

“The following are extracts from my evidence to the Cyprus Select Committee on 19 February… Asked if HMG had the right to intervene, should they wish to do so, under the terms of the Treaty of guarantee, I said: QUOTE I SAY LEGALLY WE HAD. IN POLITICAL PRACTICAL TERMS WE HAD NONE BECAUSE THE CONSTITUTION HAD NOT BEEN WORKING SINCE THE EARLY 1960s. THERE WAS FIGHTING BETWEEN THE GREEKS AND TURKS IN 1963-64 THAT WAS WHEN THE U.N. FORCE WAS PUT IN. THE TURKS CONSTANTLY COMPLAINED THAT THEY WERE EXCUDED FROM THE CONSTITUTION: THE GREEKS CLAIMED THAT THE TURKS EXCLUDED THEMSELVES. THE CONSEQUENCES OF OUR GOING IN ARE REALLY NOT A LEGAL MATTER. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO HAVE ASSEMBLED THE FORCES AND IMPOSED ON THE GREEK CYPRIOTS AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS THE WORKINGS OF THE CONSTITUTION THAT THEY HAD SINGULARLY FAILED TO DO AFTER 1960…I AM A POLITICIAN AND I SIMPLY DO NOT BELIEVE IT IS POSSIBLE TO RESTORE THAT CONSTITUTION WHICH HAS FAILED TO WORK FOR THE LAST 15 OR 16 YEARS, SO THAT ANY INVASION BY US, OR ATTEMPT BY US TO DO THAT, WOULD HAVE RECOILED ON OUR OWN HEADS…UNQUOTE”.

In actual fact Callaghan admitted that they colluded with the Turks that the status quo of the RoC had failed since 1964 and a new constitutional order was needed. Thus they agreed for Turkey to invade and they adopted as their British Policy the bi-regional federation (BBF) the Turks demanded, as per Alan Goodison’s 16 August 1974 decision and recruited Dr. Henry Kissinger to support them.

19) Pleased to hear that Mr. Mallison corrected himself after his misreading of the Law Officers document some years ago. His serious misread, taken for granted and in good faith, was quoted in articles and at least one book. https://www.philenews.com/eidiseis/article/378152/foreign-office-paranomi-i-sinthiki-engiiseos/

https://slpress.gr/ethnika/to-forein-ofis-omologei-oti-i-synthiki-eggyiseos-einai-paranomi/

Mrs. F. Argyrou published corrective articles.

https://simerini.sigmalive.com/article/2017/9/30/muthoi-kai-aletheies-gia-tis-eggueseis/

https://www.sigmalive.com/news/opinions_sigmalive/579438/oxi-to-forein-ofis-den-eipe-oti-i-synthiki-eggyiseos-einai-paranomi

20) On 18 July 1974 Adviser to Harold Wilson Lord Bridges, briefing Secretary to the Queen Lieutenant-Colonel Martin Michael Charles Charteris (later Lord) about the Cyprus situation said amongst other: “…The American attitude has been rather disappointing. Although the Foreign Secretary and Dr. Kissinger have been in frequent contact by telephone, the Americans want us to go slow in the United Nations. They are showing some reluctance to speak firmly to the Greek Government, no doubt because of their different view of their interests, particularly as regards the strategic importance of Greek bases to them. But Dr Kissinger did agree to send Mr. Sisco, a leading official in the State Department, to London overnight for talks with the Turkish Prime Minister and ourselves. We hope he can be persuaded to go to Athens, and thus get the Americans properly into the act”.

We judge the leaders of our native country based on their decisions, their actions, what they did or did not do, accept or did not accept, without fear or passion and Makarios is the first. We do not spare any criticism when they have been in the wrong leaving a dark legacy. And we do not take face value whatever foreign politicians or diplomats said about Makarios or others at times. What counts for us all (the people) are their actions and the end results, the consequences of which our people bear and suffer…

(For Makarios and his legacy book by Mr. Costas N. Hadjicostis «7 Προεδρικά Πορτραίτα», book “Μακαρίου Απομυθοποίηση” by Leonidas Leonidou , book by Fanoulla Argyrou «Διζωνική vs Δημοκρατία 1955-2019» and recent 3 volume book by Dr.Yiannos Charalambides «Εμφύλιος Πόλεμος, ΕΟΚΑ Β, Παρακράτος και Χούντα»).

Leonidas Leonidou and Fanoulla Argyrou 19.9.2024

Cyprus and Kissinger: Following the truth (30.7.2024) https://simerini.sigmalive.com/article/2024/7/30/cyprus-and-kissinger-following-the-truth/

Extracts of telegram Ramsbotham to Callaghan 18.7.1974 with reference Kissinger for Makarios “stooge”

The minutes of the meeting between Makarios and Callaghan 17.7.1974 at the Foreign Office when Makarios gave his “consent” to Callaghan for the British to work closely with the Turks

This is one of the many different maps for partition of Cyprus drawn in 1956-57 in the Foreign Office. By Sir I. Kirkpatrick himself. Hence the “Kirkpatrick line”.

1958 NATO Secretary’s criticism of Turkish demand for partition.

Source: Simerini