Written by Abdullah Bozkurt/Stockholm | Nordic Monitor

Turkey’s main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) has realigned itself closely with the ruling Islamist party led by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his far-right nationalist allies, reinforcing the widely held belief that the political opposition in Turkey has been co-opted by the authoritarian regime.

The co-opting of the CHP became more apparent following a change in leadership, when Özgür Özel, a pharmacist-turned-politician, took over the party chairmanship from Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who had served as leader for 13 years before being ousted at a party convention in November 2023.

Özel, whose background is rooted in anti-Western, neo-nationalist groups that have maintained a decade-long partnership with the Erdogan regime, has brought the CHP closer to the Erdogan government on many issues over the past year.

His primary motivation for forging a covert alliance with Erdogan appears to stem from a deep sense of insecurity in his new role as he faces challenges from the popular mayors of Istanbul and Ankara, both leading contenders for the party’s nomination in the next presidential election.

This gives Erdogan greater leeway to co-opt and control the main opposition, dilute genuine dissent to maintain the illusion of a pluralistic democracy, reduce both internal and external pressure on his authoritarian regime and bolster his claims to legitimacy.

A few months after assuming the CHP chairmanship, Özel hastily visited Erdogan at the headquarters of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) for a private meeting in May, breaking the longstanding boycott his predecessor had maintained in protest of Erdogan’s authoritarian policies.

The seating arrangement was carefully choreographed to emphasize Erdogan’s dominance, despite both being party leaders who should be equal in protocol. Erdogan sat at the center in a prominent chair, flanked by two side chairs, with only one them occupied, by Özel, sending a clear message that Özel is subordinate to Erdogan.

This did not bother Özel at all as he continued to appear beside Erdogan at public events. During the 50th anniversary celebration of the Turkish Armed Forces’ operation in northern Cyprus in July, Özel was seated in the front row near Erdogan, with the parliament speaker positioned between them. Footage from the event shows Özel leaning from a lower vantage point to chat with Erdogan, while Erdogan, appearing unmoved, looked over without much engagement throughout the celebration, further underscoring the power dynamic between them.

On October 1, when a new session of Parliament was opened with a speech by the president, Özel ended the CHP’s long-running protest of sitting during Erdogan’s addresses. He was the first to stand in respect and reverence for Erdogan, followed by other CHP deputies.

Özel has significantly shifted the CHP to align with Erdogan on numerous domestic and foreign policies, endorsing the government’s repressive measures against opposition and dissident groups, particularly concerning the Kurds and members of the Gülen movement. These groups have borne the brunt of the Erdogan regime’s crackdown, which constitutes a gross violation of Turkey’s commitment to uphold constitutional provisions and international human rights conventions.

The CHP has adopted an increasingly ultranationalist stance on several foreign policy issues, aligning itself with the Erdogan government’s positions on Greece and Cyprus, as well as embracing an anti-Western orientation.

One of Özel’s first acts after becoming party leader was to reinstate people who had been purged from the CHP over policy differences. A prime example is Bolu Mayor Tanju Özcan, an ultra-far-right nationalist and fascist politician known for cutting off aid to refugees in his city, raising transportation fares specifically for migrants and even hiring buses to transport them to the border area with Greece for pushback to Europe. Özcan was welcomed back into the CHP by Özel.

As a revitalized CHP mayor, Özcan continued his ultranationalist acts, even erecting a statue to honor Melih Demiral, who had been fined by UEFA for making the ultranationalist, racist Grey Wolves hand gesture during a match against Austria.

Whenever Erdogan found himself in troubled waters, the CHP leader was there to lend him a lifeline. For instance, it was Özel who rushed to defend the Erdogan government when Turkish officials were implicated in a corruption scandal involving dealings with the mayor of New York City and influence peddling to expedite the 2021 opening of Turkish House (Türkevi)  — a 36-story building that houses the Turkish Consulate General as well as multiple Turkish diplomatic missions.

Speaking in New York on the day an indictment was unsealed against New York City Mayor Eric Adams, Özel claimed that Turkey is not a country that would need to pay bribes to secure the opening of a skyscraper, effectively whitewashing the crimes committed by the Erdogan government.

According to the indictment filed by Damian Williams, the US attorney for the Southern District of New York, the mayor faces charges of bribery, wire fraud, conspiracy and soliciting campaign contributions from foreign nationals, including at least one Turkish government official.

In addition to accusations of accepting free airline tickets and upgrades, lavish hotel stays and illegal campaign donations from Turkey, Adams is also accused of pressuring the New York City Fire Department (FDNY) to facilitate the opening of Turkish House without a fire inspection, following a request from a Turkish official, in time for a high-profile visit by Erdogan.

The CHP leader said Turkish House is “a source of pride for all of us,” adding that his party will hold all its events in New York at Turkish House from now on. He also dismissed criticism of the building’s high cost, which amounted to $291.2 million.

It is clear that the CHP, under Özel’s leadership, has pledged allegiance to the new regime established by President Erdogan, which maintains full control over the armed forces and the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government.

By warming to President Erdogan, Özel believes he can maintain his leadership position in the CHP and stave off any challenges from within his own party, relying on crucial support from Erdogan, whether in the form of financial resources, access to government jobs or judicial assistance.

Erdogan employed the same strategy to co-opt the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) when its leader, Devlet Bahçeli, faced a serious mutiny within his own ranks and was on the verge of losing the chairmanship at the party convention in 2016. Erdogan helped quash the intra-party opposition in the MHP by using loyalist judges to rule against the initiatives of MHP dissidents, who had secured enough delegate votes to call for an extraordinary party convention.

President Erdogan seems to have mastered the political strategy of co-opting opposition parties one by one and drawing powerful politicians to his side. While opposition parties are permitted to exist, participate in elections and voice criticism, their actions are constrained within certain limits, allowing Erdogan to maintain an appearance of legitimacy without actually relinquishing real power.

The CHP is willing to share power with the AKP in local governments that oversee provinces and cities. Both CHP and AKP members benefit from personal and political gains through this cooperation in mayoral councils, operating under a “You scratch my back, and I’ll scratch yours” policy at the expense of voters.

Zoning changes that benefit wealthy and influential figures, along with the awarding of local government contracts to cronies, are often facilitated through close cooperation between CHP and AKP politicians at the local level. In exchange the Erdogan government exerts pressure on the judiciary and law enforcement agencies to overlook acts of corruption that were committed by opposition politicians.

This insidious collaboration exacts a heavy toll on Turkey, wasting taxpayers’ money, corrupting institutions, encouraging influence peddling and promoting the abuse of power with impunity. What is more, it results in a fragmented opposition as some party members accept the co-opting to enrich themselves, while others resist such policies.

Furthermore, the pretense of political opposition in Turkey stifles the emergence of a genuine opposition, allowing the Erdogan regime to feel unthreatened.

The Erdogan government now seeks to play a similar game with the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) by offering some form of legitimacy and recognition under a renewed push for peace talks with the Kurds, specifically with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

Erdogan has launched similar initiatives in the past, only to derail them when they became inconvenient for his pursuit of the peace and reconciliation process. On numerous occasions he struck secret bargains with jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, who appears more concerned with his own release than with the rights of the Kurdish people. Co-opted by the regime, Öcalan even wrote a letter of support for Erdogan during past elections, which helped to undermine the main Kurdish political party and to isolate jailed Kurdish politician Selahattin Demirtaş.

It is clear that Erdogan has managed to control the political opposition in Turkey, regulating channels of dissent according to his preferences and deceiving the Turkish population with the appearance of an opposition that addresses the grievances of ordinary citizens. This strategy allows Erdogan to play it safe on his home turf by creating a safety valve to prevent popular frustration from boiling over into mass protests.

Under Özel’s leadership the CHP risks losing credibility and support among its constituents as it is increasingly perceived as being complicit in the Erdogan regime’s brutal authoritarianism.

Furthermore, Turkish voters may ultimately lose faith in the political system’s ability to bring about meaningful change in the government. If this pattern persists for much longer, both the Erdogan government and the controlled and co-opted opposition could be delegitimized, not only in the eyes of the Turkish people but also among the international community.