With reference to the Eastern Mediterranean Policy Note titled “CYPRUS AND KISSINGER: KILLING THE MYTH” by Mr. William Mallinson posted on the University of Nicosia website on July 2024. No 100c, ISSN (online): 2547-8702.

Mr. Mallinson, referring to Dr. Kissinger’s role over the 1974 Cyprus tragedy with the two Turkish invasions 20 July and 14 August 1974 respectively, sited 16 points in his endeavour to substantiate his “myth” against Kissinger over Cyprus.

Brushing aside his ironic remarks in his Abstract, our research focuses solely on the facts. British declassified documents at the British National Archives, conclude that besides Turkey, who is the perpetrator of multiple crimes in Cyprus against humanity still enjoying impunity, it was the British Labour Government of Harold Wilson/James Callaghan (British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary respectively in 1974) that carries the blame for what the Republic of Cyprus and its people suffered during the two Turkish invasions in 1974 and the 50 years ongoing Turkish occupation of 37% of its territory.

James Callaghan in February 1976 finally explained the reasons why Britain did not intervene to stop the Turkish invasions in 1974, to the House of Commons Select Committee set up to investigate the Turkish invasions and Britain’s Treaty of Guarantee obligations.

Callaghan stated: “I dare say legally we had (an obligation). In political practical terms we had none because the constitution had not been working since the early 1960s… The consequences of our going in are really not a legal matter… I am a politician and I simply do not believe it is possible to restore that constitution which has failed to work for the last 15 to 16 years…”

The Americans during the crisis served as “collaborators”, “associates” or even “useful idiots” in what the British policy instigated. Dr. Henry Kissinger followed the British Policy over Cyprus for various reasons just as other American Governments did and do to this day. Hence the British, were the policy makers on Cyprus of the Western Alliance and at the UN and not the Americans or the French or any other country albeit with the tolerance of successive Cypriot Governments.

The 16 points raised by Mr Mallinson against Henry Kissinger:

1) “When the coup against President Makarios of Cyprus took place, Kissinger told the British Foreign Minister, Callaghan, that he wished to ‘avoid legitimizing the new regime in Cyprus’ for as long as possible, while not denouncing it immediately” and

2) “He did not wish ‘to precipitate the downfall of the de facto situation”.

3) “He questioned Britain’s moving quickly to support Makarios”.

Our response

Dr. Kissinger telephoned James Callaghan on 16 July 1974 and based on the information he had received he agreed with the line London had taken. He wanted to avoid legitimizing the new regime in Cyprus (Nicos Sampson) as long as possible. He was anxious to keep other powers from getting involved (Soviet Union). The American Government would not support proposals for Enosis (union of Cyprus with Greece) or ‘Sampson’s Government’. Callaghan asked him to think seriously how to handle Makarios. They agreed to keep in touch.

The reason the British rescued Archbishop Makarios and got him out of their Sovereign Bases and Cyprus in record time, (as per a TOP SECRET PLAN devised back in November 1967 and executed to the letter on the 16 July 1974) was because they didn’t expect Nikos Sampson to fall and they didn’t want their relations strained with the claims that the bases were being used in support of Makarios. Statement by Foreign Office official A. C. Goodison 6.8.1974.

4) According to Mr Mallinson, Kissinger questioned Britain’s wish to apply pressure on the Greek junta to withdraw their officers from Cyprus, thus giving Turkey the excuse it needed to intervene.

Our response

Exactly the opposite. On 18 July 1974 Kissinger telephoned Callaghan with a warning and asked him to pass the message to his Prime Minister (who was in Paris). Callaghan telegraphed Wilson accordingly and wrote:

«…Kissinger reiterated that to press for their withdrawal (Greek Officers) in the existing situation, could produce a dangerous shift in the power balance in Cyprus. Without the stiffening presence of some Greek Officers, the chance of disorder spilling over into inter communal strife would be increased. I said there was some force in that argument though it was not the point he had made to me yesterday. Kissinger said he was not against trying for the withdrawal of the officers, but this should only be after some constitutional solution had been reached. Kissinger said he did not want to see a resolution at the UN that day at all. He was quite happy to have a meeting of the Council tomorrow (19 July) at which Makarios could make a statement. But before any substantive move in the Council, he hoped you would agree to get the Greeks and Turks together in London perhaps on Sunday, and try to work out a constitutional solution on the basis of the 1960 Treaty. The United States would give its full support… I asked what kind of constitutional solution he had in mind. He thought we might try to shape it so that an acceptable alternative both to Sampson and Makarios could be agreed upon. For instance, Clerides. In fact this might mean the Greeks giving up Sampson and ourselves and the Turks abandoning Makarios. For the Turks this should be no great sacrifice as they had never trusted him.

Kissinger doubted whether the Cypriots would really welcome Makarios back in the present circumstances, in the guise of a Turkish stooge. Nor would Makarios himself relish that role, and he might well, in due course, seek to adjust his position by turning to the Russians.

Kissinger was clearly troubled that we might be committing ourselves too far without being able to calculate the longer-term consequences…» (PREM 16/19)

(Note. Kissinger called Makarios a Turkish stooge because the Archbishop believed the Turkish Prime Minister B. Ecevit that the Turkish army would ‘go to Cyprus’ to restore him as President and that the Turks preferred him rather than Sampson. Makarios before his speech at the UN on 19 July 1974 saw the Turkish delegation at the UN and thanked them for their understanding and help. Agreeing with him for the removal of the Greek Officers. All these were not known to the Greeks in Cyprus at the time. Nor that Makarios had given his ”consent” to James Callaghan on the 17 July 1974 for the British to work with Turkey” i.e. invasion.)

On the 19 July 1974 when Lord Bridges, Harold Wilson’s foreign affairs adviser at 10 Downing Street, received Kissinger’s message wrote confidentially:

“There have been some slight differences between us and the Americans about Makarios and his treatment. In a sense, this is a side issue, though an important one. What Dr. Kissinger does not seem to realise at present is that the Putsch in Cyprus has removed what stability there remained in the London and Zurich Agreements. That stability has been fragile enough over the past ten years. The basic questions now are: can we patch up the old treaties? Or must we now move to some new arrangements? If so, who would be the participants and guarantors of the successor treaties? It seems to me that, from what I have heard of his views over the past few days, Dr. Kissinger may be looking at the situation superficially. If he wishes to bandage the present treaties, he will have to act much more forcefully with the Greeks than he has done to date. The fact is that there is now a new major source of instability, and the administration of first aid will soon become impossible. I am not sure how far you will want to go into all this in the present message, but you may like to consider these thoughts together with the FCO comments when they arrive”.

Lord Bridges note 19 July 1974.

5) According to Mr Mallinson, “He (Kissinger) speciously using communism as an excuse to delay supporting international law”.

Our response

The American Secretary of State was not judge and jury, simply saw things from an American point of view vis-à-vis their interests and the American bases in Turkey… The British were ruling the waves on Cyprus as they do to this very day.

6) “He (Kissinger) refused to support Britain’s military obligations in Cyprus following the anti-Makarios coup”.

Our response

a) Britain never had the intention of fulfilling its military obligations towards Cyprus since December 1963. Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home on 31.12.1963 informed Duncan-Sandys the Commonwealth Secretary who had rushed to Cyprus,” we do not have the intention of using our forces even if Turkey invades…”

b) James Callaghan on 19 July 1974 informed the British High Commissioner in Nicosia that there was not going to be any British action (repeating No action) for the time being…

c) Rear Admiral A. D. Cassidi at Akrotiri base in charge of Task Force 321 between 20-31 July 1974 wrote that the Chief of the British Middle East Forces at Akrotiri had emphasised to him that the UK policy was for British forces not to take part in any fighting hence the British forces had kept a low profile. The immediate interest was the safety of the British families and if anything to withdraw to their bases.

d) The UK Government had already given the Green light to Bulent Ecevit to proceed with the invasion during their discussions on the evening of the 17 July 1974, as long as the Turkish army kept away from the British Bases. Ecevit on the same night had also made Wilson and Callaghan privy as to the boundaries of the Attila line i.e. Limnitis–Nicosia–Famagusta.

e) The UK did not need American support to help Cyprus militarily, since it had an obligation to do so, as a signatory to the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee along with Greece and Turkey. The USA was not.

7) “He (Kissinger) illogically stated that pressure to restore Makarios would strengthen the Athens Junta, when the opposite was true”.

Our response – that is Mr. Mallinson’s point of view.

8)“He (Kissinger) refused to have a NATO ministerial meeting while Turkey was attacking”

Our response – a) That was a decision taken by both Callaghan and Kissinger on 20 July 1974. B) On 14 August 1974 during the discussion between James Callaghan Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, American Secretary Henry Kissinger and American President Gerald Ford:

Dr Kissinger asked James Callaghan: “Do you think a NATO ministerial would be a good framework, or would be a possible framework to get them started again?

James Callaghan replied: “Henry, I do not want to be negative because it’s not my approach, but I really don’t. I think NATO would get itself embroiled in it with even more dire consequences for its future without being able to solve it because at the moment no Greek Cypriot can sit down with a Turkish Cypriot, or with a Turk. And by rushing into this, the Turks have made a settlement impossible. My own very strong view is that if I reproach myself with one thing it is that I didn’t put more pressure on the Greeks earlier than I did”. (PREM 16/20).

9) “He (Kissinger) suggested to Callaghan on 20 July, just after Turkey was ‘cutting loose’ that one sit on ‘the thing’ (the invasion) for a day”. (The source that Mr Mallinson adds as ref 11 does not refer to this point but to a meeting of 14 August 1974 between James Callaghan, Secretary Kissinger and President Ford.)

Our response

The British Government expected Turkey to achieve its goal with 48 hours. The British Foreign Office on same day of first invasion, 20 July 1974, informed the Australian High Commission in London that “Britain secretly would not object if Turkish Military Forces occupied about 1/3 of the island before agreeing to a ceasefire (please protect)”. (Australian Archives).

Source (Australian telegram included) – https://simerini.sigmalive.com/article/2024/7/23/zoume-gia-50-khronia-mia-bretano-tourkike-dizonike-trela/

10)“He (Kissinger) had instructed Tasca (his envoy) to tell the Greek Government that if they attacked Turkey and announced enosis, the US would immediately cut off military aid. Yet despite the Turkish invasion, he then fought tooth and nail against Congress to keep Turkey supplied with American arms. This was simply double-track diplomacy at best, or two-faced, at worst”.

Our response

The Greek Government (junta) did not attack Turkey and did not announce enosis, which Kissinger did not support. His support on keeping Turkey supplied with American arms was his decision as he saw the American interests and was defeated by Congress imposing the arms embargo against Turkey, which was lifted after Kissinger left office.

11) “According to a British Athens embassy official in Athens, the Greeks believed that the Americans had convinced them that the coup was acceptable to them, and that Turkey would not invade Cyprus”.

Our response

Which British official, which document and when? The Foreign Office Planning Department statement on 20 August 1964 is worth having in mind. (See supplementary information 5).

12) “During the negotiations, Kissinger avoided seeing the new Greek Foreign Minister, Mavros, until ‘after the Geneva negotiations were over’. Obviously, a visit would have bedevilled Turkey’s invasion plan”.

Our response

This does not prove anything and is a naïve observation. Dr. Kissinger had already seen Archbishop Makarios twice. First on the 22 July 1974 Kissinger met privately with Makarios for 1 hour and 20 minutes at which time Ambassador Dimitriou and McCloskey joined them. Makarios handed to Kissinger a six handwritten proposals for resolving the Cyprus issue. Kissinger then briefed the Ambassadors on the private conversation and remained noncommittal on who should lead Cyprus. (American released documents).

Second meeting on 29 July 1974 again in the presence of Ambassador Dimitriou and Ambassador Robert J. McCloskey. Makarios asked Kissinger to take over the negotiations and Kissinger replied “There are still too many cooks”. Makarios insisted saying “I prefer an American cook ”. Makarios would have never asked Kissinger to get directly involved if he believed that the Foreign Secretary of the USA was working with the Turks.

13) “When, at the Geneva negotiations, Kissinger’s advisers urged him to cut off military assistance to Turkey, he said that on no account must this be done, adding that he was not prepared to jeopardise the American position with Turkey”.

Our response

That was expected from any American politician who sworn to protect the American interests. But was not expected from the British ‘guarantors’ to give the green light to Ecevit to invade Cyprus in order to change the status quo of the Republic they created in 1960 and signed the “Guarantee” of its integrity on 16 August 1960 in Nicosia. The British Government had and still has an obligation to intervene military to stop both invasions and restore constitutional order.

14) “The British knew very well that the US would not prevent a Turkish invasion: On 14 August, the day of the big Turkish breakout, the British Ambassador in Washington wrote that while the Turks could not justifiably claim to have American approval for their position, particularly now that they have started fighting again, they could reasonably gamble that American disapproval would not be so forceful as to compel them to stop”.

Our response

The British also knew that they themselves would not prevent both Turkish invasions and used as a ridiculous excuse the fact that the Americans would not, simply to cover up their own collusion with Ecevit. The Americans did not have any obligations towards the security of Cyprus, the British did.

The following extract from Professor Francis Anderson’s historical research “The Division of Cyprus” re-published 23 December 2016, outlines clearly Britain’s failed obligations and the dramatic consequences and outcome of those failures.

“…But the coup was undoubtedly a breach of the Treaty of Guarantee, and within 48 hours the Turkish premier, Ecevit, was at the door of Downing Street, flanked by ministers and generals, demoing that Britain join Turkey in taking immediate action to reverse it. The meeting that ensued settled the fate of the island. It was a talk between social-democrats: Wilson, Callaghan and Ecevit, fellow members of the Socialist International. Although Britain had not only a core of well –equipped troops, but overwhelming air-power on the island – fighter – bombers capable of shattering forces far more formidable than Sampson and his minders – Wilson and Callaghan refused to lift a finger. The next day, Turkey readied a naval landing. Britain had warships off the coast, and could have deterred a unilateral Turkish invasion with equal ease. Again, London did nothing. The result was the catastrophe that shapes Cyprus to this day… After a few weeks’ ceasefire, during which Turkey made clear it had no interest in the treaty whose violation had been the technical grounds for its invasion, but wanted partition forthwith, its generals unleashed an all-out blitz – tanks, jets, artillery and warships- on the now restored legal government of Cyprus. In less than 72 hours, Turkey seized two-fifths of the island…»

15) “When Britain tried to give up its bases, Kissinger pressurised Britain not to do so, saying that Cyprus, an important part of the world chessboard, was important in the Arab/Israel dispute”.

Our response

This is another irrelevant point for “demonising” Kissinger. Yes, Kissinger pressurised Britain when in September 1974 had decided for financial reasons to consider abandoning their bases in Cyprus. However according to Callaghan they couldn’t do it because they would have had a problem with the Turks who in such a case wanted Dhekelia base to be given to them. However, the British could not do so because of their obligation, agreed in 1960 with Makarios, if and when they would not be needing their “sovereign bases” to return them to the Republic of Cyprus.

The British Government had since the end of 1973 agreed for the American U2 spy planes to use Akrotiri for their reconnaissance flights over the Middle East. And U2 had been operating from Akrotiri during 1974 before the Turkish invasions.

Furthermore, the Americans and NATO had bases in Cyprus since 1960. With the full knowledge and acquaintance of Archbishop Makarios and others in the Cyprus government. British base Cape Greco was a NATO base and under the supervision of Turkish NATO military personnel who visited once a year the base for maintenance! Due to AKEL the Communist party of Cyprus and USSR, the British covered it up as British base to help Makarios overcome any reaction from AKEL and Moscow.

16) “Kissinger claimed that the Greeks had rejected the Turkish five/six canton proposal at Geneva, when in fact, Clerides, the Greek Cypriot negotiator, had asked for thirty six hours to consider the proposal. Rather than give him the time, Turkey simply consolidated its invasion. Worse, Kissinger refuted Makarios’ claim that the US could persuade Turkey to accept a multi-regional solution. Despite what Kissinger has written, British documents confirm that it was the Americans themselves who had ‘fed the Turkish delegation with the cantonal idea’”.

Our response

At Geneva II James Callaghan (presiding both conferences Geneva I and Geneva II) did his utmost to get Gl. Clerides and G. Mavros to accept geographical federation as per the Turkish demand but Clerides told them he would be shot if he did there and then. But Callaghan believed that had they been allowed the extension of time Clerides would sign on his return.

The cantonal proposal according to Kissinger was not an official proposal (by him) simply an idea to buy some time. Besides during his second meeting with Kissinger on 29 July 1974 when he begged him to take over as negotiator (preferring as he said “an American cook” to the British), Makarios told him “you are in a position to play a positive role. You can make some proposals”. Kissinger who knew Makarios’ position told him he would send his six points to the Turkish Government. The multi-regional solution which Makarios had asked for, implied cantons. Kissinger told Makarios the truth about the impossibility of the Turks accepting a multi-regional solution. James Callaghan’s drafts in Geneva were drawn up on a geographical federation, separation of the two communities.

Makarios, having made his blunders on the 17 July 1974 with his “saviours” (the British), two days after the first Turkish invasion ran to Dr. Kissinger for help.

(Above a page from the last of James Callaghan’s drafts 13.8.1974 to secure acceptance from Clerides at Geneva II for a geographical federation).

The British had already decided the fate of Cyprus. Nothing short of their Planning Department (headed by late Sir Crispin Tickell) preparations since 3.1.1964 for the re-construction of the Republic of Cyprus into two federal constituent states, one Greek and one Turkish.

Looking ten years ahead… finally the Foreign Office sealed the fate of Cyprus on the 16 August 1974. The solution would be a bicommunal, bizonal federation (BBF) as the Turks wanted, signed Foreign Office official A. C. Goodison…

On 27 August 1974 at a meeting in Washington where Callaghan had sent his top men at the Foreign Office for a face to face discussion with Kissinger to ask for his support for their BBF solution, the first thing Kissinger intercepted saying was that “the great diplomatic feat had already been achieved of pointing him as the villain of their negotiations”. The delegation headed by Sir John Killick said “Callaghan was deliberately maintaining a low profile…”

The delegation after a very long discussion asked Kissinger if they could depend on his support for their solution of BBF. Kissinger told them the Greeks would never accept it. After consulting his President, he gave them his OK the day after. 50 years on this proposed solution is unacceptable to the majority of the Greeks of Cyprus.

Supplementary

Two meetings on 14 August 1974.

1) Harold Wilson with UN SG Kurt Waldheim at 10 Downing Street.

British Prime Minister “instructed” the Secretary General and the latter

agreed that NO Resolution for Cyprus would be passed under Article 7 of the UN Charter unless the Turks went beyond their present apparent objectives and sought to overrun the whole island or to encourage any full-scale slaughter of members of the Greek Cypriot community.

2) Same day (14.8.1974) telephone conversation between James Callaghan, Henry Kissinger and President Ford. The discussion confirms that Kissinger followed British Policy and not vice versa. As adequately explained by Dr. Klearchos A. Kyriakides in his article published in “Simerini” 18.8.2018, James Callaghan was in the driving seat and not Henry Kissinger.

3) “What we learn from this document (wrote Dr. Kyriakides), is that in this drama, Mr. Callaghan was the rider and Kissinger the horse. Even more important, we learn that both knew that Turkey followed a provocative strategy “too jingoistic, indeed too close to Hitler for my liking” as Callaghan put it, yet they did nothing”.

(Source PREM 16/20 British National Archive).

https://simerini.sigmalive.com/article/2018/8/18/abola-konta-ston-khitler/

4) On 9 August 1974 British Intelligence Services sent a top secret assessment to James Callaghan in Geneva II informing also the Americans as follows:

“Military Turkish plans in Cyprus.

The plan is in conformity with what we knew of Turkish planning prior to the intervention. We think the Turks always hoped to secure Famagusta … the plan will be carried out irrespective of the outcome of the Geneva talks and not later than 20 August (1974)”.

5) Finally an extract from a document, written on 20 August 1964 by Sir Crispin Tickell’s Planning Department of the Foreign Office (signed R. L. Wade-Gery) raises many questions and answers a lot of others:

“Obviously a coup would be politically impossible for the Greeks to justify or the Turks to tolerate… but there may be a moment when a successful coup could open the way to a reason solution… This could only be achieved by the Americans and ourselves. We need know nothing about the coup in advance (it would indeed be very undesirable if we did), but we should have to be ready to act fast once it had taken place. What we should need to do would be to extract the necessary minimum of secret unilateral promises from each side to prevent their forces from engaging each other”.

Conclusions

During the 1974 Cyprus crisis USA’s Foreign Secretary Dr. Henry Kissinger was not innocent of the island’s misfortune suffering two Turkish invasions, executions, human rights violations, ethnic cleansing and the occupation of its northern part. Kissinger, however, was not the main policy maker. He followed the British policy over Cyprus for various reasons, just as all American governments before and after him. He could have decided not to do so. However he did stay faithful to the American/British special relationship besides other reasons related to how he perceived serving the American interests.

The undisputed fact remains that the British Government of Harold Wilson and James Callaghan bear the blame for allowing both Turkish invasions to go ahead, knowing very well the consequences, and for colluding with Ecevit to change the constitutional legal status of the Republic of Cyprus.

It is unacceptable that 50 years on from the two bloody invasions of 1974, the Foreign Office continues the same unproductive policy based on the unworkable and racist BBF, which is in line with the Turkish demands and Dr. Nihat Erim’s plan of November 1956 of how to “recapture the whole of Cyprus”.

Fanoulla Argyrou

Researcher/journalist/author

Reader in the British National Archives since 1985 and Associate writer in Simerini newspaper in Cyprus since 1988. Associate writer also in “Eleftheria” in London.

Author of 10 books 9 on Cyprus based mostly on material from the British National Archives and 1 book on the Pontiac Greek Genocide. (Archival references to the above included in two of the writer’s books «Διζωνική Εκτέλεση της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας 1955-2011» Λεμεσός, and «Διζωνική vs Δημοκρατία» Λεμεσός 2019.

Leonidas Leonidou

Researcher/author

Official biographer of General Georgios Grivas Dhigenis and reader in the British National Archives. Author of 23 books (www.leonidasleonidou.org) related to the modern History of Cyprus.

Source: Simerini