Greece is one of the key actors in the Eastern Mediterranean engaged in an atypical energy war, in which each participant must strategically leverage the available means to bolster their energy security. The geopolitical tensions unfolding in the region are directly linked to the discovery and production zones of energy resources. This interrelation situates energy within the broader security framework, establishing energy security as an emerging sector of domestic and foreign policy (Sklias & Flouros, 2019).

The Concept of Energy Security

The notion of energy security entails multiple interpretations and varying characteristics depending on the country, time frame, or energy source to which it is applied (Chester, 2010). Historically, definitions have focused on energy availability, reliability, and affordability (Bahgat, 2006). Generally, energy security can be interpreted as “the uninterrupted availability of energy at an affordable price.”

As global energy demand rises, available resources appear increasingly limited and unevenly distributed (Kruyt et al., 2009). Simultaneously, complex geopolitical transformations highlight the intrinsic relationship between national and energy security (Radovanović, Filipović & Pavlović, 2017), positioning energy as a top national priority. States aim to secure not only the availability of natural energy resources but also the production processes and optimal transportation routes (Arman et al., 2021).

The four dimensions of energy security are defined as Availability, Accessibility, Acceptability, and Affordability (Asia Pacific Energy Research Center, 2007).

Availability

Significant hydrocarbon deposits have been discovered in the Ionian Sea, to the southwest and southeast of Crete, and in the northern Aegean (Capital.gr, 2023). Approximately 85% of these deposits are estimated to be natural gas, positioning Greece as an emerging natural gas producer. 

The offshore regions of Western Greece and southern Crete seem geologically similar to the Southeastern Mediterranean rock formations, where significant gas reserves have been identified (Capital, 2023). Vast marine areas remain unexplored, presenting opportunities for greater energy leverage and strategic advantage.

In 2023, Greece’s natural gas imports decreased by 13% compared to 2022 in line with efforts to reduce dependence on Russian gas (IENE, 2024). Concerning fossil fuels, Greece possesses limited domestic reserves, making it reliant on imports. This dependence is illustrated by the country’s low levels of crude oil production (Figure 1).

Figure 1

Crude oil production chart

Source: Enerdata

Major crude oil suppliers in 2022 were Iraq (44%), Kazakhstan (17%), Libya (16%), and Saudi Arabia (10%) (Enerdata). Notably, dependency on Russia has significantly declined: in 2021, Russia accounted for 96% of hard coal imports, 41% of natural gas, 21% of crude oil, and a smaller share of petroleum products (International Energy Agency). Greece has also reduced the share of fossil fuels used in electricity generation (Figure 2), though further progress remains possible.

Figure 2

Source: Our World In Data

2023 marked a turning point for Greece’s clean energy production, with 57% of the energy mix derived from RES (primarily wind and solar). This figure was 50.12% in 2022 (IPTO, 2024).

Thanks to its advantageous geographic location and RES potential, Greece could become a significant energy actor in the Eastern Mediterranean. However, unaddressed Turkish provocations may facilitate Turkish geopolitical ambitions, thus weakening Greece’s regional influence.

Accessibility

The “strategic advantage of Turkey’s position in the international system” (Davutoğlu, 2010), coupled with persistent attempts to exert pressure on Greece, Cyprus, and the broader Eastern Mediterranean, has complicated access to recently discovered hydrocarbon reserves. Petroleum geologist and Energean VP Konstantinos Nikolaou stated that “exploration in Crete is not about whether gas will be found, but about sovereign rights” (Energypress, 2024). Finalizing these explorations will signify the defence of Greek interests, especially in light of the persistent absence of strong political will to counteract Turkish expansionist policies.

Acceptability

Acceptability refers both to the existence of adequate infrastructure for utilizing available and accessible energy resources and to the minimization of environmental impact. Greece has four refineries (Enerdata, n.d.) for processing fossil fuels (Table 1).

Table 1

Refineries in Greece

Source: Ministry for Reconstruction of Production, Environment, 2015

Imported natural gas is distributed via the National Natural Gas Transmission System through Sidirokastro (Greek-Bulgarian border), Kipoi (Greek-Turkish border), and Agia Triada (entry point from the Revithoussa LNG terminal) (RAAEY, n.d.). One of the key gas pipeline systems is the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which runs from Greece to southern Italy and is the main source of gas imports to Europe from Azerbaijan. (Aenert, 2024).

Regarding electricity infrastructure, Greece has partnered with Bulgaria, Italy, and North Macedonia to enhance interconnection capacity and integrate into the European electricity market.

Furthermore, Greece’s RES capabilities could support electricity exports, provided authorities establish the appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks for timely and transparent project implementation. RES development has spurred the creation of wind farms, exploiting wind energy and its growing storage potential (Figure 3).

Figure 3

Source: Hellenic Wind Energy Association

However, concerns arise about wind turbine construction in designated forests or reforest areas (Gov. Gazette 2464/B/03.12.2008), due to potential environmental degradation or bird population harm (Kati et al., 2021). Additionally, unchecked wind farm development has been linked to land-grabbing phenomena, dating back to the pre-memorandum era (Maki & Velegakis, 2022).

Besides RES, other forms of clean and efficient energy can be utilized. Hydrogen holds significant potential for expanding clean energy production (Yue et al., 2021), though it remains underexplored. The EU’s “Hydrogen Strategy for a Climate-Neutral Europe” emphasizes the development of renewable hydrogen and calls on member states to begin infrastructure planning (European Commission, 2020). Hydrogen can be environmentally friendly, as it can be produced from water and revert to water upon oxidation (Rosen & Koohi-Fayegh, 2016).

Affordability

Greece’s climate targets align with the broader EU objectives for combating climate change. However, these targets must be tailored to each country’s economic feasibility and acceptance (Pellerin-Carlin, 2017). Greece has the highest electricity production cost in Europe, nearly double the EU average (Figure 4 – ELIAMEP, 2023). Electricity bills also include various fees and surcharges, many unrelated to actual consumption (International Energy Agency).

Figure 4

Source: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy – ELIAMEP

Producing energy from RES requires the construction of environmentally sustainable storage units. Compared to conventional fuels, RES demands higher levels of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to develop necessary support infrastructure. Therefore, promoting RES without diverting investment from imported oil and gas may not necessarily enhance Greece’s energy security (Proedrou, 2022).

Turkish Provocations

Turkey has repeatedly engaged in aggressive actions undermining Greece’s energy security aiming to assert dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean and limit Greek and Cyprus sovereignty over energy-rich maritime zones.

Tensions date back to 1976, when the research vessel Hora violated the Greek continental shelf, initiating decades of friction. The 1987 crisis escalated when Seismic (formerly Hora) conducted surveys in Greek waters, prompting military threats from Greece that ultimately prevented further escalation.

In 2019, the Turkey-Libya maritime memorandum, which delineates sea zones in violation of Greek and Cypriot sovereign rights, aimed to establish a strategic fait accompli. This agreement disregards the existence of Crete and other Greek islands, severely impeding the exploitation of Greek energy reserves.

In 2020, the Oruç Reis vessel conducted illegal seismic surveys within Greece’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), escorted by warships—an act that escalated tensions and led to EU sanctions against Turkey. However, Turkish activity continues unabated.

In July 2024, Turkish warships closely monitored the Italian research vessel Levoli Relume during submarine cable-laying operations south of Kasos for the Greece-Israel-Cyprus electricity interconnector. In June 2024, Turkey issued a NAVTEX claiming an area between Rhodes and Crete by the C/S Teliri—as part of its continental shelf.

In early 2025, tensions escalated again as Turkish warships shadowed survey operations in international waters, prompting diplomatic complaints from Athens and renewed EU attention.

Turkey has signalled its intent to disrupt the regional balance in the Eastern Mediterranean and lay claim to maritime zones and energy reserves to which it holds no legitimate entitlement. The “Blue Homeland” doctrine reflects Turkey’s unwavering ambition to expand its naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean (Maris, Flouros, & Galariotis, 2022). The presence of Turkish military forces near Greek islands intensifies the perception of threat and affirms Turkey’s expansionist agenda and pursuit of regional power.

Conclusion

While several scholars advocate for Greece’s leadership role in shaping the geopolitical landscape of the Eastern Mediterranean (Bakhshandeh & Yeganeh, 2023), it is evident that Strategic Dialogues with the United States have catalyzed regional partnerships—such as the Greece-Cyprus-Israel-USA (3+1) format and the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF). The French government, concerned by Turkey’s growing influence, has supported these initiatives (Lambert & Shath, 2023).

Meanwhile, Turkey seeks to forge alliances with Balkan states (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia) to apply geopolitical pressure on Greece’s northern borders (Tansel, 2020), advancing its expansionist objectives. 

Overall, Turkey’s actions not only violate international law but also pose direct threats to Greece’s energy security, impeding the development of vital infrastructure and the exploitation of Eastern Mediterranean reserves. Strengthening international cooperation and adopting a deterrence strategy is essential for safeguarding Greece’s national interests.

The exploration and eventual implementation of gas pipelines connecting Greece to Europe serve the EU’s energy diversification goals and the US’s diplomatic stance toward Russia (Deniozos et al., 2018). Coordinated initiatives by the relevant Greek ministries are crucial for financing and completing projects aligned with national interests. A clear demonstration of political will is vital to fully utilize existing and emerging tools that enhance Greece’s energy security. Achieving energy autonomy will equip the Greek nation with the strategic strength and international recognition it currently lacks.

A deeper analysis of Turkey’s global role and influence may further illuminate why international institutions have thus far been unable to halt its persistent violations of international law.