Assessing the prospect of the use of nuclear weapons by international and regional actors through references to their strategic documents

Written by George Koukakis

Abstract

The creation of the atomic bomb brought historical changes in the way war is fought, as for the first time a state could easily cause major casualties to another using a single strike. Since then, the United States and Russia began an arms race in order to gain nuclear superiority, leading to the period known as the Cold War. Even though nuclear weapons have never been used in a war since 1945 when the United States bombed Japan, the recent nuclear rhetoric of Russia against the West during the on-going war in Ukraine has resulted in the revival of the nuclear threat, as many analysts express the fear that several actors can and will use nuclear weapons in the context of their conflict with other actors, a hypothesis that if becomes reality will have disastrous consequences for mankind. The purpose of this research paper is to evaluate the strategy of the contemporary nuclear actors as it is described in several strategic documents, in order to assess the prospect of a nuclear World War III in the context of the major on-going conflicts.

Key words: Australia, China, Deterrence, France, Gaza, Grand Strategy, Hamas, India, Iran, Israel, Kashmir, North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, Pakistan, Russia, Security, Taiwan, UK, Ukraine, USA, War

1. Introduction

Albert Einstein –the world famous Nobel Prize winner theoretical physicist that is known inter alia for the calculation of the energy that is released during an atomic explosion (Annex A)– is also responsible for influencing the United States (US) officials on developing the ‘Manhattan Project’ that led to the creation of the atomic bomb. In 1939 – according to the Atomic Heritage Foundation– Albert Einstein and Leo Szilard wrote a letter warning the US President about the German efforts to create nuclear weapons, also proposing that the United States should start its own atomic research.¹ Later on though, he admitted regretting having sent that letter and assisted the world efforts of nuclear non- proliferation, also stating that:

“I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones.”²

The present research paper deals with the scenario of a future nuclear (world) war in the context of the nuclear capabilities acquired major regional and international actors, as they are defined in their official strategic documents. Its importance lies in the fact that it draws information from recent official strategic documents of both Western and Eastern nuclear actors, providing a comprehensive analysis of the academic and political debate on the use of nuclear weapons. Thus, the research paper contributes not only in the existing literature regarding grand strategy but also in the respective one regarding the study of war, especially as far as the use of nuclear weapons in concerned.

Its purpose is to evaluate the grand strategy of the contemporary nuclear actors as described in several strategic documents, in order to assess the prospect of a nuclear World War III in the context of major on-going conflicts. The main conclusion of the research is that –despite the fact that the main purpose of nuclear weapons is achieving deterrence– there is no guaranty that the contemporary nuclear actors will not make use of their nuclear capabilities, as there are specific trigger points regarding several

¹ Atomic Heritage Foundation . (n.d.). Albert Einstein. https://ahf.nuclearmuseum.org/ahf/profile/albert- einstein/

² Evon, D. (2018, April 16). “Did Albert Einstein Say World War IV Will be Fought ‘With Sticks and Stones’?”. Snopes. https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/einstein-world-war-iv-sticks-stones/ (19/05/2024)

on-going conflicts that may lead to a nuclear regional war that could easily lead to a nuclear World War III with the participation of additional major actors.

The research paper briefly presents the historical background of four on-going conflicts, namely the War in Ukraine, the War in Gaza, the Taiwan Conflict, and the Kashmir Conflict, then it examines the 2024 Annual Threat Assessment of the United States regarding contemporary interstate and intrastate conflicts and the use of nuclear weapons, it proceeds to the presentation of the nuclear capabilities of major regional and international actors –Russia, USA, China, France, UK, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea– and continues by referring the context of the official strategic documents of the aforementioned actors plus Iran and Australia as far as nuclear weapons are concerned. Finally, it presents several trigger events that may lead to a nuclear (world) war and the strategy that modern actors will most probably use in case of a war.

2. Contemporary conflicts around the world

Our century has been recently characterised as an era of polycrises (multiple crises of different nature) and permacrises (crises of long duration),³ part of which are several interstate and intrastate conflicts around the world (Annex B) that threaten regional and international security. Some of the interstate conflicts though –due to the fact that the conflicting parts possess nuclear weapons– are far more concerning than others, the use of which may result in the involvement of several other nuclear and non-nuclear actors, leading eventually to a World War III that would confirm Winston Churchill’s quote according to which:

“The story of the human race is War. Except for brief and precarious interludes there has never been peace in the world; and before history began murderous strife was universal and unending”.⁴

³ Koukakis, G. (2023). Permacrises and Polycrises: Outlining the Contemporary Security Environment through References to Strategic Documents of Regional and International Actors. HAPSc Policy Briefs Series, 4(2), 55–64. https://doi.org/10.12681/hapscpbs.36661

⁴ Langworth, R. (2015, April 15). Churchill on War: Part 1. The Churchhill Project [Hillsdale College]. https://winstonchurchill.hillsdale.edu/churchill-on-war-part-1/#_ftn11

The most concerning on-going contemporary conflicts between actors that possess nuclear capabilities are the War in Ukraine between Russia and Ukraine, the War in Gaza between Israel and Hamas, the Taiwan Conflict between China and Taiwan, and the Kashmir Conflict between India and Pakistan, a brief analysis of which is going to be presented in the next paragraphs.

1. 1. The War in Ukraine (Russia-Ukraine)

Despite the fact that Russia annexed Crimea –Ukraine’s peninsula in the Black Sea– in 2014 using force, the War in Ukraine is generally considered to have been initiated on February 24, 2022 when Russia executed the so called ‘special military operation’ invading Ukraine in four axes (Annex C) in order to denazify Ukraine and protect the Russian citizens living there. Although Russia managed to seize a significant part of Ukrainian terrain in the beginning of the War (Annex D), Ukraine’s military, financial, political, and moral support from the majority of the Western states quickly led Ukrainian troops to regain control of majority of the seized terrain, confining Russia to the South-Eastern part of Ukraine (Annex E). The most concerning event though, was the Russian nuclear rhetoric threatening to use its nuclear capabilities in case the West deployed troops in Ukraine to assist the latter’s fight against Russia.⁵

1. 2. The War in Gaza (Israel-Hamas)

The War in Gaza was initiated on October 7, 2023 when Hamas –an Islamist organisation that is identified by several western actors as a terrorist group– suddenly invaded Israel (Annex F), as an act of retaliation for the Israeli crimes against Palestinians. Besides military personnel, Hamas’ fighters killed, tortured, raped and held captive many civilians, an action that resulted in a massive counterattack on behalf of Israel, as its Prime Minister stated that “[…] The enemy will pay an unprecedented price […]”.⁶ A few weeks later, Israel launched the offensive operation ‘Swords of Iron’ in Gaza

⁵ Faulconbridge, G. & Kelly, L. (2024, March 14). Putin warns the West: Russia is ready for nuclear war. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-says-russia-ready-nuclear-war-not-everything-rushing- it-2024-03-

13/#:~:text=MOSCOW%2C%20March%2013%20(Reuters),significant%20escalation%20of%20the%20confli ct.

⁶ Prime Minister’s Office. (2023, October 07). Statement by PM Netanyahu [Press Release]. Government of Israel. https://www.gov.il/en/pages/spoke-statement071023

strip,⁷ while on April 13, 2024 the Armed Forces of Iran conducted operation ‘True Promise’ against Israel –using a combination of missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)–⁸ as a response to the death of seven high-ranked Officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) that took place during an Israeli attack on the Iranian Consulate in Damascus (Syria) on April 01, 2024.⁹ The Iranian action led Israel to the conduction of a small scale Air Force attack on April 18, 2024 that fortunately didn’t result in a further escalation of tension.¹⁰ By late June 2024 the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) had advanced to the Southern part of Gaza, having dismantled most of the Hamas’ forces (Annex G).

1. 3. The Taiwan Conflict (China-Taiwan)

As far as the conflict between China and Taiwan –officially known as the Republic of China (RoC)– is concerned (Annex H), it must be stressed that the island of Taiwan was initially part of the Chinese Empire from 1600’s until 1895 when it became part of Japan, and in 1945 it returned to China.¹¹ Since 1949 Taiwan has a special status having its own government and Armed Forces but is not officially recognised as a sovereign state by most states, despite the close ties that it retains with the United States and India. It must also be stressed that Taiwan plays a crucial worldwide role as far as technology is concerned as it is the biggest semiconductor chip manufacturer,¹² and that China supports the ‘One Country, two Systems’ that does not accept a sovereign Taiwan.¹³ Finally, the US support of Taiwan –such as the US House Speaker’s visit to

⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel. (2023, October 28). Statement by PM Netanyahu. https://www.gov.il/en/pages/statement-by-pm-netanyahu-28-oct-2023

⁸ Cafiero, G. (2024, April 15). Why Iran attacked Israel and what could happen next. The New Arab. https://www.newarab.com/analysis/why-iran-attacked-israel-and-what-could-happen-next

⁹ Chao-Fong, L. (2024, April 01). Middle East crisis: Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps says two of its generals killed in Damascus consulate strike – as it happened. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2024/apr/01/israel-hamas-war-airstrike-iran-consulate- gaza-syria-live-updates

¹⁰ Hendrix, S., Harris, S., George, S. & Birnbaum, M. (2024, April 19). After Israeli strike in Iran, both sides appear to downplay incident. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/04/19/israel-iran-strike-isfahan/

¹¹ Geopolitical Futures. (May 27, 2022). The Long Fight to Control Taiwan. https://geopoliticalfutures.com/the-long-fight-to-control-taiwan/

¹² Chandnani, M. (2022, November 27). Taiwan, China, the US, and India’s Role in the Big Picture in the Indo-Pacific. Medium. https://medium.com/@mayurchandnaniofficial/taiwan-china-the-us-and-indias-role-in- the-big-picture-in-the-indo-pacific-a16db44a7304

¹³ Wei, C. (2023) “One Country, Two Systems” and the Realization of the Complete Reunification of China: A Synthesis of Narrative Reviews. Chinese Studies, 12, 126-139. doi: 10.4236/chnstd.2023.122012.

Taiwan on August 02, 2022–¹⁴ has repeatedly resulted in the deterioration of the US- Chinese relations, as China has expressed that does not accept the intervention of third parties in its domestic issues.

1. 4. The Kashmir Conflict (India-Pakistan)

Kashmir is a region of the former British India (Annex I) that after its 1947 partition into the sovereign states of Pakistan and India joined the latter.¹⁵ Since then, there have been four Indian-Pakistani wars in 1947 (1^st Kashmir War), 1965 (2^nd Kashmir War), 1971 (Bangladesh Independence War), and 1999 (Kargil War), while a Line of Control (LoC) was established in 1972 dividing Kashmir into two parts and in 2003 India and Pakistan agreed on a cease-fire. In 2001 and 2008 tension escalated again (Annex J), to be improved in 2014 after Narendra Modi’s election as India’s Prime Minister only for a short period as in 2016 it was again deteriorated. In 2018 a second cease-fire was agreed between the two parts, and in 2019 India terminated Kashmir’s autonomous status by Law, as a response to several violent incidents. The aforementioned action led to more violent incidents that resulted in a third cease-fire in 2021 that seems to be extremely fragile as several major incidents have occurred since then.¹⁶

3. The assessment of the US Annual Threat Assessment

The Annual Threat Assessment (ATA) of the United States is a strategic document issued by the Office of Director of National Intelligence (ODNI),¹⁷ the US Intelligence Official that since 2004 –the year when the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) provided for its establishment– serves as the head of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC)¹⁸ with a core mission of “[…] synchronizing collection, analysis, and

¹⁴ Herb, J. (2022, August 02). US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi lands in Taiwan amid threats of Chinese retaliation. CNN Politics. https://edition.cnn.com/2022/08/02/politics/nancy-pelosi-visit-taipei-taiwan- trip/index.html

¹⁵ Center for Preventive Action. (2024, April 09). Conflict Between India and Pakistan. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-between-india-and-pakistan

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Office of Director of National Intelligence. (n.d.). Who we are. https://www.dni.gov/index.php/who-we-are

¹⁸ U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. (n.d.). Intelligence Community Member Agencies. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/resources

counterintelligence […]”¹⁹ of the members of the IC “[…] so that they are fused, effectively operating as one team”.²⁰ As far as the 2024 ATA is concerned,²¹ its overall assessment regarding the use of nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is that:

“The expansion of nuclear weapons stockpiles and their delivery systems, coupled with increasing regional conflicts involving nuclear weapons states, pose a significant challenge to global efforts to prevent the spread and use of nuclear weapons”.²²

It also underlines the influence of technology in the development and use of nuclear weapons that will eventually affect the world efforts to control their proliferation, the attempt of China and Russia to gain strategic stability with the USA, North Korea’s intention to conduct an additional nuclear test, and the risk of a nuclear escalation between India and Pakistan. More precisely, the references that are related to major interstate and intrastate conflicts and the use of nuclear weapons by major actors are presented in the following paragraphs.

1. 1. Potential Interstate Conflict

As far as interstate conflict is concerned, the 2024 ATA stresses the fact that besides regional security it affects several policy fields –such as the economy and human rights– as well, also having the potential to create a spill over effect that can endanger international security.²³ The interstates conflicts that ATA emphasizes on are the following:

1. 1. • China Maritime, in the South and East China Seas (Annex H).

      • India – China, in the shared disputed border (Annex I).

      • India – Pakistan, in Kashmir (Annex I).

      • Azerbaijan – Armenia, in Nagorno-Karabakh.

¹⁹ Office of Director of National Intelligence. (n.d.). How we work. https://www.dni.gov/index.php/how-we- work

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Office of Director of National Intelligence. (2024, February 05). Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community [Official Document]. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA- 2024-Unclassified-Report.pdf

²² Ibid, p. 31.

²³ Ibid, p. 25.

1. 2. Potential Intrastate Turmoil

As far as intrastate turmoil is concerned, the 2024 ATA underlines that is usually a result of several (social, economic, demographic, climate, etc.) factors and can easily lead to the escalation of violence, insurgencies and domestic conflict.²⁴ The interstate turmoil that ATA emphasizes on includes the following:

1. 1. • The Balkans, especially in Kosovo and Bosnia & Herzegovina.

      • Afghanistan.

      • Sudan.

      • Ethiopia.

      • The Sahel.

      • Haiti.

      • Venezuela.

1. 3. Transnational Issues

As far as transnational Issues are concerned, the 2024 ATA stresses their interaction with other threats due to the interconnectivity among states,²⁵ indicating that the most contested spaces are the following:

weapons.

• Disruptive Technology.

• Digital Authoritarianism and Transnational Repression.

• Weapons of Mass Destruction, such as nuclear, chemical and biological

In addition, it highlights the fact that there are also various non-state actors’ issues such as:

• • Transnational Organized Crime (Foreign Illicit Drugs, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes, Cyber Crime, and Undermining Rule of Law).

  • Human Trafficking.

  • Global Terrorism (ISIS, Al-Qa‘ida, Hizballah, Transnational Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists).

  • Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs).

1. 4. The Use of Nuclear WMD by Major State Actors

As far as China’s nuclear capabilities are concerned, the 2024 ATA stresses the fact that:

“China remains intent on orienting its nuclear posture for strategic rivalry with the United States because its leaders have concluded their current capabilities are insufficient […] As its nuclear force grows, Beijing’s confidence in its nuclear deterrent probably will bolster the PRC’s resolve and intensify conventional conflicts”.²⁶

Regarding Russia’s nuclear capabilities, the 2024 ATA highlights the fact that:

“Russia will continue to modernize its nuclear weapons capabilities and maintains the largest and most diverse nuclear weapons stockpile. Moscow views its nuclear capabilities as necessary for maintaining deterrence and achieving its goals in a potential conflict against the United States and NATO, and it sees this as the ultimate guarantor of the Russian Federation. Russia’s inability to achieve quick and decisive battlefield wins, coupled with Ukrainian strikes within Russia, continues to drive concerns that Putin might use nuclear weapons”.²⁷

²⁶ Ibid, p. 9.

²⁷ Ibid, p. 16.

As far as Iran’s nuclear capabilities are concerned, the 2024 ATA underlines the fact that:

“Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons- development activities necessary to produce a testable nuclear device […] Iran uses its nuclear program to build negotiating leverage and respond to perceived international pressure. […]Tehran has the infrastructure and experience to quickly produce weapons- grade uranium, if it chooses to do so. Iran probably will consider installing more advanced centrifuges, further increasing its enriched uranium stockpile, or enriching uranium up to 90 percent in response to additional sanctions, attacks, or censure against its nuclear program”.²⁸

Regarding North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, the 2024 ATA stresses the fact

that:

“North Korean leader Kim Jong Un will continue to pursue nuclear and conventional military capabilities that threaten the United States and its allies, which will enable periodic aggressive actions as he tries to reshape the regional security environment in his favour. […] Kim remains strongly committed to expanding the country’s nuclear weapons arsenal, which serves as the centerpiece of his national security structure. […] North Korea also unveiled a purported tactical nuclear warhead and claimed it could be mounted on at least eight delivery systems, including an unmanned underwater vehicle and cruise missiles”.²⁹

4. Nuclear Capabilities of Major Actors

One of the first things that needs to be underlined is that the United States and Russia possess together almost 90% of the world wide nuclear weapons. The second

²⁸ Ibid, p. 19.

²⁹ Ibid, p. 21.

thing is that not all nuclear weapons have the same result, as some are characterised as strategic due to its ability to strike large targets in extremely long distances (from one continent to another), while others are characterised as tactical due to their shortest trajectory and smaller impact (Annex K). Taking into consideration the aforementioned factors, the nuclear capabilities of the nine contemporary major nuclear actors –as far as the active nuclear warheads in military service in addition to the ones that await dismantlement (Annex L)–, are the following:

State/Actor	2023 (ACA)	2024 (FAS)	Deployed Strategic (FAS)	Remarks (FAS)
Russia	5,889	5,580	1,710	Increase
USA	5,244	5,044	1,670	Decrease
China	410	500	—–	Increase
France	290	290	280	Stable
UK	225	225	120	Increase
Pakistan	170	170	—–	Increase
India	164	172	—–	Increase
Israel	90	90	—	Stable
North Korea	30	50	—–	Increase
Note: The cells highlighted in bold letters indicate an increase in the nuclear stockpile

Table 1: The assessed number of nuclear warheads per actor

Source: Edited by Georgios Koukakis ©

5. Major actors’ strategic documents

The term ‘strategy’ originates from the Greek word ‘στρατηγία’ (strategia) meaning the art of the general, and it was first used to describe a specific military plan.³⁰ Through time though, it was used in other scientific fields as well to describe a certain course of action, having as its basic elements the ends (goals) that an actor wishes to achieve, the

³⁰ Owens, M. T. (2007). Strategy and the Strategic Way of Thinking. Naval War College Review, 60(4), pp. 111-124. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol60/iss4/10

ways (military, political, economic, etc.) of achieving them, and the means needed,³¹ in addition to a threat assessment –also known as risk analysis– evaluating the impact of each threat in order to facilitate their mitigation through the balance of ends, means, and ways.³² As far as the term ‘strategic’ is concerned, it is used to characterise something that is of great importance for an organisation, corporation, political party, state, etc., as according to Lawrence Freedman:

“If a decision can be described as strategically significant, then it is obviously more important than decisions of a more routine nature”.³³

That said, it can easily be understood that when referring to strategic documents academics usually mean state and non-state actors’ official texts that regulate their bilateral or multilateral relations –especially in vital policy fields such as security & defence, economy, and energy– with other actors. These documents have a variety of titles including the following:

• Concept.

• Doctrine.

• Strategic Plan.

• Strategy.

• Charter.

• Agreement.

• Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).

• Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC).

³¹ Meiser, J. W. (2017). Ends + Ways + Means = (Bad) Strategy. The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters, 46(4), pp. 81-91. https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3000&context=parameters

³² Miller, D. G., Rogers. C., Park, J. F.., Owen, F. W. and Meiser, W. J. (2017). On Strategy as Ends, Ways, and Means. The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters, 47(1), pp. 125-131. https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2843&context=parameters

³³ Freedman, L. (2013). Strategy: A History. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. ix. https://www.google.gr/books/edition/Strategy/uIVoAgAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1

1. 1. Russia

As far as Russia is concerned, the ‘Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation’³⁴ that was issued on March 31, 2023 refers that:

1. 1. • One of the reasons that Russia is considered to be a ‘Great Power’ is the fact it possesses nuclear weapons.

      • There is a high risk that several conflicts around the world will escalate into a global war with the participation of states that possess nuclear power.

      • The maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security is a high priority for Russia, which intends to ensure inter alia by eliminating the risk of using nuclear WMD.

      • Russia intends to ensure strategic stability inter alia by the use of nuclear

WMD.

• Russia aims at the reduction of nuclear potentials of other actors.

• Nuclear-weapon-free zones must be backed-up by security guarantees.

• Nuclear safety & security needs to be strengthened and nuclear terrorism

1. 1. • Nuclear deterrence is a top priority for the USA.³⁷

      • By 2030 the USA will have to deal with two major nuclear competitors.³⁸

      • The USA is modernizing their nuclear capabilities.³⁹

      • The USA intends to endorse a strategy in which the role of nuclear weapons is reduced.⁴⁰

      • Nuclear deterrence is not efficiency by its own.⁴¹

      • The USA intends to prevent Russia form achieving its objectives by the use of threat of use of nuclear weapons.⁴²

      • Nuclear non-proliferation requires cooperation with other actors, renewed arms control and nonproliferation leadership and the enhancement of the respective institutional framework.⁴³

      • The Korean Peninsula needs to be denuclearization completely.⁴⁴

      • The USA will use diplomatic means –and other means if diplomatic fail– to

prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.⁴⁵

1. 3. China

As far as China is concerned, the ‘White Paper’ entitled ‘China’s National Defense in the New Era’⁴⁶ that was issued on July 24, 2019 refers that:

1. 1. • The USA and Russia have enhanced their nuclear capacities.

      • The nuclear program of Iran has taken an ‘unexpected turn’.

      • China follows a ‘NO FIRST USE’ policy regarding nuclear weapons and will not use it against non-nuclear actors, but only as a mean of deterrence and self- defence.

³⁶ Ibid, pp. 11-12.

³⁷ Ibid, p. 21.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid, p. 22.

⁴² Ibid, p. 26.

⁴³ Ibid, pp. 29-30.

⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 38.

⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 42.

⁴⁶ The State Council of the People’s Republic of China. (2019, July 19). China’s National Defense in the New Era.

https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html

1. 1. • China favors the complete destruction of nuclear weapons and maintains the minimum nuclear level required.

      • Nuclear weapons ensure the national sovereignty and security.

      • China supports every non-proliferation initiative through the signature of respective Treaties and/or Agreements.

1. 4. France

The ‘National Strategic Review’⁴⁷ of France that was is issued on November 9, 2022 provides for the use of nuclear weapons that:

1. 1. • Nuclear threats used in the context of increased strategic competition aim to accomplish the intimidation of other actors.⁴⁸

      • Nuclear weapons are crucial for achieving deterrence, engaging in

strategic dialogue and protecting the French national interests.⁴⁹

1. 1. • China’s nuclear growth constitutes a challenge.⁵⁰

      • Russia’s ‘nuclear threat policy’ undermines the strategic equilibrium and intensifies the proliferation of nuclear weapons.⁵¹

      • Joint action is needed to counter Russia’s aggressive policy.⁵²

      • Nuclear proliferation is at stake due to Russia’s, China’s and North Korea’s nuclear growth.⁵³

      • Nuclear weapons are a crucial tool for France as far as asserting its

interests is concerned.⁵⁴

1. 1. • France’s defence strategy and strategic autonomy is based on nuclear deterrence.⁵⁵

⁴⁷ Government of the Republic of France. (2022, November 09). National Strategic Review [Official Document]. https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/rns-uk-20221202.pdf

⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 7.

⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 8.

⁵⁰ Ibid, p. 1.

⁵¹ Ibid, p. 11.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid, p. 12.

⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 19.

⁵⁵ Ibid, p. 20.

1. 1. • In order for nuclear deterrence to be able to fulfill its purpose –that is to protect France from other actors; aggression– it must be combined with a credible political, operational and technical system.⁵⁶

      • The nuclear capabilities of France enable the strategic functions of ‘Intervention’ and ’Influence’.⁵⁷

      • Achieving ‘a robust and credible nuclear deterrent’ has been set as the 1^st strategic objective of France and will allow it to defend its metropolitan and overseas territories.⁵⁸

      • France’s nuclear deterrence serves also as a European nuclear deterrence ensuring security in the Euro-Atlantic area⁵⁹ and the protection of the European airspace.⁶⁰

      • Nuclear deterrence is vital for and complimentary to the conventional deterrence.⁶¹

      • France’s nuclear deterrent allows it to follow specific and independent defence policy in the context of its participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).⁶²

      • France strongly supports the NPT and the four respective multilateral export control regimes.⁶³

1. 5. The United Kingdom

As far as the UK is concerned, the Integrated Review Refresh (IRR) entitled ‘Responding to a more contested and volatile world’⁶⁴ that was issued on March 13, 2023 refers that:

1. 1. • Both Iran and North Korea are enhancing their nuclear capabilities.⁶⁵

⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 22.

⁵⁷ Ibid, pp. 23-24.

⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 27.

⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 33.

⁶⁰ Ibid, p. 44.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid, p. 41.

⁶³ Ibid, p. 46.

⁶⁴ HM Government. (2023, March 13). Integrated Review Refresh 2023: Responding to a more contested and volatile world [Official Document]. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/641d72f45155a2000c6ad5d5/11857435_NS_IR_Refresh_202 3_Supply_AllPages_Revision_7_WEB_PDF.pdf

1. 1. • The UK will increase its defence expenditure including its nuclear capabilities.⁶⁶

      • The UK will deepen its cooperation with Australia, especially as far as the construction of nuclear-powered submarines in the context of AUKUS is concerned.⁶⁷

      • The UK has taken measures aiming at the reduction of Chinese involvement as far as the civil nuclear sector and nuclear industrial espionage is concerned.⁶⁸

      • Nuclear deterrence is the foundation of the UK’s deterrence and

defence.⁶⁹

1. 1. • Nuclear weapons will be used only in extreme circumstances of self-

defence and the defence of the UK’s allies.⁷⁰

1. 1. • The UK’s nuclear deterrence is also NATO’s nuclear deterrence.⁷¹

      • The UK is against Iran’s attempt to acquire nuclear weapons and North Korea’s nuclear advancement.⁷²

      • The UK supports the NPT and the respective arms control architecture.⁷³

      • Nuclear technology is also a big part of the UK efforts to develop clean energy in addition to ensuring energy security.⁷⁴

      • Nuclear deterrence is one of the four pillars of the foreign policy workforce framework.⁷⁵

1. 6. Pakistan

The first ever ‘National Security Policy’⁷⁶ of Pakistan issued on January 14, 2022 provides for the use of nuclear weapons that:

⁶⁵ Ibid, p. 8.

⁶⁶ Ibid, p. 12.

⁶⁷ Ibid, p. 24.

⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 30.

⁶⁹ Ibid, p. 33.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid, p. 40.

⁷² Ibid, pp. 41-41.

⁷³ Ibid, p. 43.

⁷⁴ Ibid, p. 47.

⁷⁵ Ibid, pp. 58-59.

⁷⁶ National Security Division. (2022, January 14). National Security Policy of Pakistan 2022-2026 [Official Document]. https://static.theprint.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/NSP.pdf

peace.⁷⁷

• Nuclear deterrence is vital for ensuring strategic stability and regional

• India’s nuclear expansion disturbs the regional strategic balance.⁷⁸

• Pakistan does not intend to get involved in a nuclear arms race but

granted.⁸⁴

• The nuclear program of Iran causes regional instability.⁸³

• The effectiveness of the US sanctions on Iran must not be taken for

• India cannot engage in a dialogue with Pakistan unless the latter

1. 8. Israel

Despite the fact that it is world famous for its national security system, Israel hasn’t published an official national security strategic document yet. That said, according to the report entitled ‘Nuclear weapons at a glance: Israel’⁸⁹ that was issued on July 28, 2022 by the House of Commons of the UK Parliament:

1. 1. • Israel implements a ‘policy of ambiguity’, meaning that it does not officially admit having on NOT having nuclear weapons.⁹⁰

      • Israel is NOT part of the NPT.⁹¹

1. 9. North Korea

As far as North Korea is concerned, the ‘Nuclear weapons at a glance: North Korea’⁹² that was issued on May 17, 2022 by the House of Commons of the UK Parliament refers that:

1. 1. • From 2006 to 2017 North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests.⁹³

      • The Nuclear Doctrine of North Korea is assessed to have transformed form a ‘Doctrine of Deterrence’ to a ‘Doctrine of Pre-emptive First Strike’.⁹⁴

      • North Korea self-declared itself a ‘Nuclear State’ in 2012.⁹⁵

      • North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003.⁹⁶

1. 10. Iran

The report entitled ‘What is the status of the Iran nuclear deal?’⁹⁷ that was issued on April 24, 2024 by the House of Commons of the UK Parliament refers that:

⁸⁸ Ibid, p. 40.

⁸⁹ Mills, C. (2022, July 28). Nuclear weapons at a glance: Israel [Official Document]. House of Commons Library of the UK Parliament. https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9075/CBP- 9075.pdf

⁹⁰ Ibid, p. 4.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Mills, C. (2022, May 17). Nuclear weapons at a glance: North Korea [Official Document]. House of Commons Library of the UK Parliament. https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP- 9071/CBP-9071.pdf

⁹³ Ibid, p. 4.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid, p. 5.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

• Iran claims that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes.⁹⁸

• In 2018 the USA withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

(JCPOA)⁹⁹ reached in 2015.¹⁰⁰

• Iran violates JCPOA since 2019.¹⁰¹

1. 11. Australia

Finally, despite the fact that Australia does not possess nuclear weapons, its ‘AUKUS’ Strategic Partnership with the United States and the United Kingdom regarding the development of nuclear-powered submarines rises several concerns for other actors of the Indo-Pacific. Australia’s ‘National Defence Strategy’¹⁰² that was issued on April 17, 2024 refers that:

1. 1. • North Korea’s nuclear aggressive behaviour is a destabilising factor.¹⁰³

      • The conflict between India and Pakistan as well as India and China, may lead to the use of nuclear weapons.¹⁰⁴

      • Russia, China, North Korea and Iran are constantly enhancing their nuclear capabilities.¹⁰⁵

      • The extended nuclear deterrence provided to Australia by the United States is considered as the best protection against nuclear threats.¹⁰⁶

      • The use of nuclear weapons on behalf of Russia will affect actors worldwide.¹⁰⁷

      • Nuclear capabilities require a workforce having specialised skills.¹⁰⁸

⁹⁷ Mills, C. (2024, April 24). What is the status of the Iran nuclear deal? [Official Document]. House of Commons Library of the UK Parliament. https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP- 9870/CBP-9870.pdf

⁹⁸ Ibid, p. 2.

⁹⁹ Arms Control Association. (n.d.). The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) at a Glance. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/joint-comprehensive-plan-action-jcpoa-glance

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Australian Government. (2024). 2024 National Defence Strategy [Official Document]. https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2024-04-17/2024-national-defence-strategy

¹⁰³ Ibid, p. 14.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, p. 15.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, p. 19.

1. 1. • Nuclear capabilities ensure the protection of Australia’s security interests.¹⁰⁹

      • The acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines is part of the Australian Defence Forces’ (ADF) reshaping that aims to improve deterrence,¹¹⁰ in accordance with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreements.¹¹¹

      • Through AUKUS, Australia will be able to contribute to the Indo-Pacific’s

stability.¹¹²

1. 1. • Australia is planning to establish a nuclear-powered submarine industrial

base.¹¹³

6. Trigger events for initiating a nuclear World War III

Before proceeding any further to the analysis of the trigger events that may initiate a nuclear (world) war, it must be stressed that the research conducted in International Relations provides assessments on the evolution of the current situation based on historical facts, expressed theories, retrieved data, and –of course– human logic, rather than mere ‘predictions’ based on instinct, luck and/or personal favour. That said, the following actions are considered by the author as the main trigger events for initiating –in an indirect way– a nuclear World War III, as they will most probably escalate tension to a point where the conflicting regional actors may consider using nuclear weapons as a solution of ‘last resort’, leading to the involvement of international actors in an effort to protect their national interests.

1. 1. The War in Ukraine (Russia-Ukraine)

As far as the War in Ukraine is concerned, the main trigger event for initiating the use of nuclear weapons is Ukraine’s accession in NATO. The reason for this is that Russia has repeatedly stated both written in many official documents and verbally through high-ranked officials that NATO’s enlargement to the East is considered by Russia as a major threat to its national security.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, p. 22.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, pp. 37-38.

¹¹¹ Ibid, p. 51.

¹¹² Ibid, p. 42.

¹¹³ Ibid, p. 59.

Another trigger event is the direct engagement of western military forces in the Ukrainian theater of war either as a NATO mission or as a national mission of a NATO member-state. This has also been verbally stated by several Russian high-ranked officials and is the main reason that NATO hasn’t deployed military troops in Ukraine but indirectly supported Ukraine by providing ammunition, training Ukrainian personnel, etc.

A third reason might be Crimea’s reunification with Ukraine, as it not only deprives Russia from major strategic advantages that are mainly connected to the fact it provides access to the Black Sea, but also due to the fact that it signals a major loss on behalf of Russia that will affect the moral of its troops.

1. 2. The War in Gaza (Israel-Hamas)

The main trigger event as far as the War in Gaza is concerned –taking into consideration that Hamas does not possess nuclear weapons but maintains close ties with and is backed up by Iran– is the involvement of Iran in the conflict, as the aforementioned incidents of April 2024 indicate that a similar event can easily get out of hand leading even to the use of use nuclear weapons. In that case, Israel will most probably be supported by the United States and Iran by Russia, transforming the War in Gaza into another ‘West- East’ conflict.

1. 3. The Taiwan Conflict (China-Taiwan)

As far as the Taiwan Conflict is concerned, the main trigger event for initiating the use of nuclear weapons is Taiwan’s declaration of independence. Despite the fact that China maintains a ‘NO FIRST USE’ policy as far as nuclear weapons are concerned and the fact that Taiwan possesses significantly less Armed Forces (Annex H), the United States is assessed that will back up Taiwan’s action leading to a major escalation of tension in the South China Sea that will eventually turn into an additional confrontation between ‘West’ and ‘East’ by the joining of other actors, as the Indo-Pacific has already become the center of global competition.

1. 4. The Kashmir Conflict (India-Pakistan)

As far as the Kashmir Conflict is concerned, taking into consideration India’s military superiority (Annex O), the re-election of (the moderate) Narendra Modi as India’s Prime Minister and the ‘NO FIRST USE’ policy of India regarding the use of nuclear weapons, it is assessed that the only trigger event that would initiate a nuclear World War

III is a major armed conflict that would pose a threat to India’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and democratic function.

7. World War III Strategy: Threats, risks, ends, means & ways

The conduction of a nuclear World War III remains a possibility as long as there are actors that possess nuclear capabilities. Yet, taking into consideration the fact that the nuclear actors’ leadership is aware of the devastating sequences of the use of nuclear weapons in addition to the variety of new means and ways to control critical spaces, it is assessed that the vast majority of nuclear actors will continue to follow a ‘NO FIRST USE’ policy as long as they have alternative options. This is estimated because according to the world famous Chinese strategist Sun Tzu “When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not press a desperate foe too hard.” meaning that an enemy in despair is more likely to endorse an irrational and unpredictable course of action.¹¹⁴

Thus, a future World War III strategy will more likely comprise of military (conventional and non-conventional) and civilian operations, using every Branch (Army, Marines, Air Force, Navy, Space Force and Cyber Force) of the Armed Forces to conduct Multi-Domain Operations (MDOs) parallel to the imposition of sanctions, the conduction of political consultations, espionage and the weaponisation of migration and/or energy/food resources, in order to gain strategic advantage, gain initiative and restore deterrence.

1. 1. Threats & Risks

Before examining the contemporary threats and risks, it must be stressed that the term ‘security threat’ usually refers to an actor that has the means and intention of

¹¹⁴ Giles, L. (2000). Sun Tzu on the Art of War. (Leicester: Allandale Online Publishing). p. 29. https://sites.ualberta.ca/~enoch/Readings/The_Art_Of_War.pdf

harming and other, while the term ‘security risk’ refers to every other factor that doesn’t pose a direct and intentional danger for an actor, such as climate change, natural disasters, economic crises, environmental degradation, etc.¹¹⁵ Some of the most commonly identified contemporary security threats and risks (Annex M) are the following:

1. 1. • Russia.

      • China.

      • Terrorism.

      • Cyberattacks.

      • Proliferation of WMD.

      • Armed Conflict.

      • Climate Change.

      • Financial Instability.

      • Health Crises.

      • Degradation of Critical Infrastructure and/or Supply Chain.

1. 2. Ends

As far as the desired ends to be achieved by actors, taking into consideration Clausewitz’s description of war as the continuation of politics by other means in order to compel an actor to do another actor’s will by force,¹¹⁶ it is understood that the general principles of war remain the same through time since actors will always try to impose their will to their enemies. Whatever change is made, usually refers to the ways (methods) that actors implement and the means they use in order to achieve the ends of war, as these evolve through time mostly depending to the advancement of technology. Regardless of the ways and means used though, each actor’s efforts basically aim at gaining control of one (or more) of the following spaces:

1. 1. • Land (ground and underground).

¹¹⁵ Wallander, C. & Keohane, R. (2002). Risk, threat, and security institutions. In R.O. Keohane (Ed.), Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World (pp. 87-114). Routledge,

p. 91.

https://dl1.cuni.cz/pluginfile.php/486331/mod_resource/content/0/Robert%20Keohane%20Power%20and%2 0Governance%20in%20a%20Partially%20Globalized%20World.pdf

¹¹⁶ Shephard, J. (1990). On War: Is Clausewitz Still Relevant?. The US Army War College Quarterly:

Parameters, p. 86. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA515723.pdf

• Sea (surface and sub-surface).

• Air space.

• Space.

• Cyberspace.

• Information space.

1. 3. Ways

If we were to choose only one word to describe the ways that state and non- state actors will use to accomplish their defined ends when engaged in a World War III, that word would be ‘hybrid’ as nowadays modern actors use a combination of traditional and non-traditional ways in order to impose their will to their opponents. These ways include (but are not limited to) the conduction/implementation of one (or combination) of the following:

1. 1. • Military (conventional and non-conventional) Operations.

      • Foreign Information Manipulation & Interference (FIMI).¹¹⁷

      • Cyberattacks.

      • Economic Sanctions.

      • Political Consultations.

      • Deterrence.

      • Espionage.

      • Instrumentalisation of Migration and/or Energy/Food Resources.

1. 4. Means

Finally, as far as the means needed/used by modern actors in order to implement their strategy and achieve the desired ends, these include (but are not limited) the following:

¹¹⁷ FIMI is defined by the European Union External Action Service (EEAS) as “[…] a pattern of behaviour that threatens or has the potential to negatively impact values, procedures and political processes. Such activity is manipulative in character, conducted in an intentional and coordinated manner. Actors of such activity can be state or non-state actors, including their proxies inside and outside of their own territory”. For further details visit: Strategic Communications. (2024, May 27). Tackling Disinformation, Foreign Information Manipulation & Interference. European Union External Action Service. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/tackling-disinformation-foreign-information-manipulation-interference_en

1. 1. • Conventional Armed Forces.

      • Special Operations Forces (SOF).

      • Unmanned Systems.

      • Intelligence Services.

      • Hackers.

      • The media.

      • Satellites.

      • Critical Infrastructure.

      • The Diplomatic Service.

8. Concluding Remarks

To conclude, it must be stressed that –taking into consideration the facts presented in the paper– the use of strategic nuclear weapons is not likely, as it will have tremendous consequences in international level. Nevertheless, it needs to be understood that –despite the fact that the main purpose of nuclear capabilities is achieving deterrence and strategic stability– the use of nuclear weapons in tactical (more probable) and strategic (less probable) level remains a possibility that cannot be excluded, as it depends on many factors. In any case, nuclear on not, it must be reminded that –given the variety of contemporary means other than military force (political, economic, etc.) to conduct war in addition to the fact that the purpose of war is to impose an actor’s will to its opponents– war can nowadays take many forms besides armed conflict. In fact, this is the essence of strategy as according to Sun Tzu:

“[…] the skillful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field.”¹¹⁸

¹¹⁸ Giles, L. (2000). ibid. p. 9

Annex A. The Science of Nuclear Weapons

Source: https://www.visualcapitalist.com/science-of-nuclear-weapons/#google_vignette

Towards a nuclear World War III? Assessing the prospect of the use of nuclear weapons by international & regional actorς through references to their strategic documents

Annex B. Conflicts around the World (as of January 2024)

Source: https://twitter.com/ACLEDINFO/status/1748375844806852854

Annex C. Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine (February 24, 2022)

Source: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-update-7

Annex D. The War in Ukraine (March 30, 2022)

Source: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign- assessment-march-30

Annex E. The War in Ukraine (June 20, 2024)

Source:https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/DraftUkraineCoT%20June%2 020%2C%202024.png

Annex F. Hamas’ Invasion of Israel (October 07, 2023)

Source: https://www.inss.org.il/publication/war-data/

Annex G. The Israel-Hamas War in Gaza Strip (June 17, 2024)

Source: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-17-2024

Annex H. The Taiwan Issue

Source: https://geopoliticalfutures.com/the-long-fight-to-control-taiwan/

Annex I. India’s Border Dispute with its Neighbouring Actors

Source: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/indias-border-dispute-with- neighbors/1859854

Annex J. The India- Pakistan Conflict

Source: https://siddranooraayqamar.medium.com/timeline-india-pakistan-relations- fbdc0f701dc4

Annex K. Strategic vs Tactical Nuclear Weapons (characteristics)

Source: https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/pakistan-india-nuclear-standoff-subcontinent

Annex L. Nuclear Capabilities of Major Actors

Source: https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance

Source: https://fas.org/initiative/status-world-nuclear-forces/

Annex M. USA-Russia Strategic Arms Control Milestones

Date Milestone (Agreement or Event) Remarks

_{1987, December} Signing of the ‘Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces’ (INF) Treaty¹²⁰

Terminated in August 2019

_{2022, May} Signing of the ‘Strategic Offensive Reductions’ (SORT) Treaty¹²²

Terminated in February 2011

Annex N. Contemporary Security Threats & Risks

Threats & Risks of the Security Environment	Strategic Compass (EU)	Strategic Concept (ΝΑΤΟ)	National Security Strategy (USA)	National Security Strategy (Germany)	National Security Strategy (Japan)
Russia	Χ	Χ	Χ	Χ	Χ
China	Χ	Χ	Χ	Χ	Χ
North Korea	–	–	Χ	–	Χ
Iran	–	–	Χ	–	–
Terrorism	X	X	Χ	Χ	Χ
Violent Extremism	X	–	–	Χ	–
Organised Crime	X	–	–	Χ	–
Human Trafficking	X	X	–	–	–
Hybrid Conflicts	X	X	–	–	Χ
Cyberattacks	X	X	Χ	Χ	Χ
Instrumentalisation of Migration	X	X	–	–	–
Proliferation of WMD	X	X	Χ	Χ	Χ
Financial Instability	X	X	Χ	Χ	–
Extreme Social Decline	X	–	–	–	–
Extreme Economic Decline	X	–	–	Χ	–
Information Manipulation/Espionage	X	X	–	–	Χ
Foreign Interferance	X	–	–	Χ	–
Armed Conflicts	X	X	Χ	Χ	Χ
Climate Change	X	X	Χ	Χ	Χ
Environmental Degradation	X	X	–	Χ	–
Natural Disasters	X	–	–	–	Χ
Health Crises (Pandemics)	X	–	Χ	Χ	Χ
Malicious Activities in Space	–	X	–	–	–
Energy Sources Manipulation	–	X	Χ	–	Χ
Economic Coercion	–	X	–	–	Χ
Undermining of Multilateral Rules/Institutions	–	X	–	–	Χ
Promotion of Autocratic Governance Models	–	X	–	–	–
Fragility & Instability of States	–	X	–	–	–
Destruction of Cultural Heritage	–	X	–	–	–
Investment in New Technologies	–	X	–	Χ	–
Degradation of Critical Infrastructure/supply chain	– X Χ			Χ	Χ
Food crises, Hunger	– – Χ			Χ	Χ
Poverty	– – Χ			Χ	–
CBRN Agents	– – –			Χ	–
Piracy	– – –			–	Χ

Source: Translation of the table included in the article Koukakis, G. (2023). Permacrises and Polycrises: Outlining the Contemporary Security Environment through References to Strategic Documents of Regional and International Actors. HAPSc Policy Briefs Series, 4(2), 55–64. https://doi.org/10.12681/hapscpbs.36661

Annex O. India-Pakistan Military Balance (2019)

Source: https://www.arabnews.com/node/1459236/world

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About the author

Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Georgios KOUKAKIS has graduated from the Hellenic Military Academy (2002), the Hellenic Army War College (2020) and the Hellenic Supreme Joint War College (2023). He retired in 2024 on his own initiative, after serving for 22 years as a Leader and Staff officer in several Special Forces and Infantry Units,

and as an Instructor in the Hellenic Airborne School and the Hellenic Infantry School.

He holds a Master of Arts in ‘Governance, Development and Security in the Mediterranean’ from the Department of Mediterranean Studies of the University of the Aegean (Rhodes, Greece) –having graduated 1^st among his Class with his dissertation focusing on the prospects of establishing a National Security Council (NSC) in the Hellenic Republic (Greece)– and an Adult Instructor of the Continuing Education and Lifelong Learning Center (CE-LLC) of the University of the Aegean (Rhodes, Greece).

He is also a Senior Analyst in the Center for International Strategic Analyses (KEDISA), a Research Associate of HERMES Institute of International Affairs, Security & Geoeconomy (I.I.A.S.GE.) and a member of the Hellenic Institute of Strategic Studies (HEL.I.S.S.), ALLILONnet the Global Network of Greeks and Friends of Greece for Solidarity in the Professional Field and the Mercury Negotiation Academy (MNA). He has participated as a speaker in several seminars and conferences regarding international relations in the fields of foreign policy, security and defense.

Many of his articles and research papers have been published in the ‘Global Security and Intelligence Notes’ (GSIN) and the ‘South and South East Asia Security Research Centre’ (SSEASRC) Research Notes of the Buckingham Centre of Security & Intelligence Studies (BUCSIS), the ‘HAPSc Policy Briefs’ Journal of the Hellenic Association of Political Scientists, the ‘NRDC-GR Herald’ Journal of NRDC-GR, the ‘Military Review’ Journal of the Hellenic Army General Staff (HAGS), the ‘Cultural Diplomacy Journal’ of the Hellenic Institute of Cultural Diplomacy (HICD).

In addition to his involvement in academic research regarding international relations, Georgios is a columnist in a number of foreign affairs, geopolitics and international affairs websites such as ‘Foreign Affairs – The Hellenic Edition’, ‘Policy Journal’, ‘Geopolitics & Daily News’, ‘HuffPost Greece’, ‘Liberal’, ‘Infognomon Politics’, ‘LEP’ and ‘Active News’.

He is the co-author of the book (In Greek) ‘National Security: Myths and Reality’ that was published in April 2023, and the Academic Head of the Educational Programme (in Greek) “Security Studies in the Mediterranean (BASIC)” of the CE-LLC of the University of the Aegean.

Email : g_k_koukakis@yahoo.gr

LinkedIn : Georgios Koukakis Research Gate : Georgios Koukakis Academia : Georgios Koukakis

Author’s Published Research

(Chronological order)

Κουκάκης, Γ. (2019). Επιχειρήσεις υποστήριξης της ειρήνης και διεθνείς οργανισμοί: Η περίπτωση του Κοσόβου. Η Ελλάδα, η Ευρώπη & ο Κόσμος, Τεύχος 13 (Α’ Εξάμηνο 2019), σσ. 46-58. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/361893243_Epicheireseis_yposterixes_t es_eirenes_kai_diethneis_organismoi_E_periptose_tou_Kosobou

Κουκάκης, Γ. (2020). Έχουμε τελικά Συμβούλιο Εθνικής Ασφάλειας;. Η Ελλάδα, η Ευρώπη & ο Κόσμος, Τεύχος 15 (B’ Εξάμηνο 2020), σσ. 101-112. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/361893250_Echoume_telika_Symboulio

_Ethnikes_Asphaleias

Κουκάκης, Γ. (2022). Συμβούλιο Εθνικής Ασφάλειας: Απόψεις, προτάσεις και προοπτικές σύστασής του στην Ελλάδα [Ερευνητική Εργασία Νo.72]. Κέντρο Διεθνών Στρατηγικών Αναλύσεων. https://www.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.15631.66729/1

Κουκάκης, Γ. (2022). Στρατηγική και Εξωτερική Πολιτική: H Στρατηγική του Υπουργείου Εξωτερικών για το 2022 [Ερευνητική Εργασία Νo.73]. Κέντρο Διεθνών Στρατηγικών Αναλύσεων. https://www.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.33467.08483

Κουκάκης, Γ. (2022). Αποκλειστική Οικονομική Ζώνη: Οι προσπάθειες οριοθέτησής της από τα κράτη της Ανατολικής Μεσογείου [Ερευνητική Εργασία Νo.77]. Κέντρο Διεθνών Στρατηγικών Αναλύσεων. https://www.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.31789.36324

Κουκάκης, Γ. (2022). FRONTEX: Η αναβάθμιση του «αφανή» Ευρωπαϊκού Οργανισμού Συνοριοφυλακής και Ακτοφυλακής. Ελληνικό Ινστιτούτο Στρατηγικών Μελετών. https://www.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.13039.71840/1

Κουκάκης, Γ. (2022). Ουκρανία: Ο πόλεμος (και) της πληροφορίας. Ελληνικό Ινστιτούτο Στρατηγικών Μελετών. https://www.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.35144.80641/1

Κουκάκης, Γ. (2022). Προς τα που δείχνει η Στρατηγική Πυξίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης; [Ερευνητική Εργασία Νo.78]. Κέντρο Διεθνών Στρατηγικών Αναλύσεων. https://www.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.11656.70406

Koukakis, G. (2022). The June 29^th-30^th, 2022 NATO Summit: An assessment of the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept and future security considerations [Briefing Note No “1/2022”]. HERMES Institute of International Affairs, Security & Geoeconomy. https://www.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.25917.33763

Κουκάκης, Γ. (2022). Η τριμερής συνεργασία Ελλάδας, Κύπρου & Ισραήλ και οι επιπτώσεις της στην ενεργειακή ασφάλεια της Ελλάδας και της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και τη σταθερότητα στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο, στο Τετράδια Γεωπολιτικής Ανάλυσης και Μελετών, Τεύχος 5. Ελληνικό Ινστιτούτο Στρατηγικών Μελετών. https://www.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.19206.45126

Koukakis, G. (2022). The 2022 NATO Madrid Summit: Background, Key Decisions, and Future Considerations [Briefing Note No “2/2022”]. HERMES Institute of International Affairs, Security & Geoeconomy. https://www.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.30499.32808

Koukakis, G. (2022). The 2020 EEZ delimitation agreement between Greece & Egypt [Short Comments]. HERMES Institute of International Affairs, Security & Geoeconomy. https://www.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.24965.42725/1

Koukakis, G. (2022). The trilateral partnership between Greece, Cyprus & Israel: Background, recent developments and future considerations regarding the security environment in the Eastern Mediterranean. Hellenic Institute for Strategic Studies. https://www.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.24533.29927

Koukakis, G. (2022). How the war in Ukraine is changing the European security environment: European Union’s new CSDP mission in Ukraine [Research Paper No.84]. Center for International Strategic Analyses,. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.10715.44329

Koukakis, G. (2022). Establishing the Greek National Security Council: A Comparative Case Study Analysis with the National Security Council of the United States. Global Security and Intelligence Notes, 6.

https://www.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.29309.64481

Koukakis, G. (2023). International & National Security strategic documents issued in 2022 [Research Paper No.90]. Center for International Strategic Analyses. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.26099.60969

Koukakis, G. (2022). The Evolution of NATO’s Strategic Concept. NRDC-GR HERALD, Issue 19 (July-December 2022), pp. 34–40. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/368369713_The_Evolution_of_NATO’s_ Strategic_Concept

Κουκάκης, Γ. (2023). Στρατηγική Πυξίδα: Η νέα στρατηγική της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης για την ασφάλεια και την άμυνα. Η Ελλάδα, η Ευρώπη & ο Κόσμος, Τεύχος 18 (Α’ Εξάμηνο 2023), σσ. 55-65. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/376308160_Strategike_Pyxida_E_nea_s trategike_tes_Europaikes_Enoses_gia_ten_asphaleia_kai_ten_amyna

Koukakis, G. (2022). The National Security Strategy of the USA: Background, Recent Developments and Future Considerations Regarding the International Security Environment. HAPSc Policy Briefs Series, 3(2), pp. 122–132. https://doi.org/10.12681/hapscpbs.33792

Κουκάκης, Γ. (2023). Η πορεία ένταξης της Τουρκίας στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση (1999- 2022) [Ερευνητική Εργασίας Νo.91]. Κέντρο Διεθνών Στρατηγικών Αναλύσεων. https://www.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.29705.72806

Πικραμένος, Κ. & Κουκάκης, Γ. (2023). Εθνική Ασφάλεια: Μύθοι και Πραγματικότητα. (Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Ινφογνώμων). https://www.researchgate.net/publication/369775588_Ethnike_Asphaleia_Mythoi_ kai_Pragmatikoteta

Κουκάκης, Γ. (2023). Η ένταξη της Φινλανδίας στο ΝΑΤΟ και το μέλλον της υποψηφιότητας της Σουηδίας [Ερευνητική Εργασία Νo.92]. Κέντρο Διεθνών Στρατηγικών Αναλύσεων. https://www.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.22751.53920

Κουκάκης, Γ. (2023). Οι κυρώσεις ως συντελεστές ισχύος ενός κράτους ή οργανισμού [Ερευνητική Εργασίας Νo.94]. Κέντρο Διεθνών Στρατηγικών Αναλύσεων. https://www.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.14122.08648

Koukakis, G. (2023). The Establishment of a National Security Council by the Republic of Cyprus [Short Comments]. HERMES Institute of International Affairs, Security & Geoeconomy. https://www.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.15642.82882

Koukakis, G. (2023). Resilience: Highlighting its Importance for Security and Development through References to (National) Security Strategic Documents of International Actors. HAPSc Policy Briefs Series, 4(1), pp. 77–87. https://doi.org/10.12681/hapscpbs.35186

Κουκάκης, Γ. (2023). Το Στρατηγικό Σχέδιο του Ελληνικού Υπουργείου Εξωτερικών για την περίοδο 2023-2026, στο Τετράδια Γεωπολιτικής Ανάλυσης και Μελετών. Τεύχος 6 (Διμερείς διακρατικές συμφωνίες της Ελλάδος που εμπεριέχουν και αμυντική διάσταση). Ελληνικό Ινστιτούτο Στρατηγικών Μελετών, σσ. 10-33. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/373238770_To_Strategiko_Schedio_tou

_Ellenikou_Ypourgeiou_Exoterikon_gia_ten_periodo_2023-2026

Κουκάκης, Γ. (2023). Η Στρατηγική Εταιρική Σχέση για την Άμυνα & την Ασφάλεια μεταξύ Ελλάδας & Γαλλίας: Μία «τεχνοκρατική» προσέγγιση και αποτίμηση του πρώτου έτους ισχύος της, στο Τετράδια Γεωπολιτικής Ανάλυσης και Μελετών. Τεύχος 6 (Διμερείς διακρατικές συμφωνίες της Ελλάδος που εμπεριέχουν και αμυντική διάσταση). Ελληνικό Ινστιτούτο Στρατηγικών Μελετών, σσ. 75-95. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/373238862_E_Strategike_Etairike_Sche se_gia_ten_Amyna_ten_Asphaleia_metaxy_Elladas_Gallias_Mia_technokratike_p rosengise_kai_apotimese_tou_protou_etous_ischyos_tes

Κουκάκης, Γ. (2023). Η προοπτική ολοκλήρωσης της Κοινής Εξωτερικής Πολιτικής και Πολιτικής Ασφάλειας της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης μετά την εισβολή της Ρωσίας στην

Ουκρανία [Ερευνητική Εργασία Νo.97]. Κέντρο Διεθνών Στρατηγικών Αναλύσεων. https://www.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.24551.21925

Κουκάκης, Γ. (2023). Η Στρατηγική Εθνικής Ασφάλειας της Αρμενίας, το Ναγκόρνο- Καραμπάχ (Αρτσάχ) και τα διδάγματα για την εθνική, περιφερειακή και διεθνή ασφάλεια [Ερευνητική Εργασία Νo.101]. Κέντρο Διεθνών Στρατηγικών Αναλύσεων. https://www.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.26202.52160

Koukakis, G. (2023). The 9^th Trilateral Summit of Cyprus, Greece and Israel: Türkiye’s struggle for power in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Competition between India and China in the Middle East, and the New Era of “Economic Peace” [Occasional Paper 1/2023]. HERMES Institute of International Affairs, Security & Geoeconomy,. https://www.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.18271.84645

Κουκάκης, Γ. (2023). Ο γεωπολιτικός ανταγωνισμός Δύσης – Ανατολής μέσα από τα επίσημα στρατηγικά έγγραφα διεθνών και περιφερειακών δρώντων [Ερευνητική Εργασία Νo.102]. Κέντρο Διεθνών Στρατηγικών Αναλύσεων. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.32137.62561

Koukakis, G. (2023). Permacrises and Polycrises: Outlining the Contemporary Security Environment through References to Strategic Documents of Regional and International Actors. HAPSc Policy Briefs Series, 4(2), pp. 55-64. https://doi.org/10.12681/hapscpbs.36661

Koukakis, G. (2024). The Institutional Reform of the Greek National Intelligence Service (NIS) and its First Historical 2023 Annual Report: Threats, Challenges and Future Considerations Regarding the National Security of the Hellenic Republic [Occasional Paper 1/2024]. HERMES Institute of International Affairs, Security & Geoeconomy,. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.35429.58082

Koukakis, G. (2024). NATO vs Hybrid Threats: The case of Russian disinformation campaign. NRDC-GR HERALD, Issue 21 (June-December 2023), pp. 42-48. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/378085748_NATO_vs_Hybrid_Threats_ The_case_of_Russian_disinformation_campaign

Koukakis, G. (2024). National Security, Foreign Policy, Intelligence, Cybersecurity, National Defence, Maritime Security, Risk Analysis and Foresight Strategic Documents Issued by Regional and International Actors in 2023 [Research Paper No.104]. Center for International Strategic Analyses. https://www.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.11150.13121

Koukakis, G. (2024). The future status of Greek bilateral relations with Türkiye and Egypt in light of the December 7^th, 2023 Athens Declaration between Greece and Türkiye and visit of the Turkish President to Egypt on February 14^th, 2024 [Short Comments]. HERMES Institute of International Affairs, Security & Geoeconomy. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.20138.39361

Κουκάκης, Γ. (2024). Η Εξέλιξη του Στρατηγικού Δόγματος του ΝΑΤΟ και προβληματισμοί για το μέλλον, στο Τετράδια Γεωπολιτικής Ανάλυσης και Μελετών. Τεύχος 8 (Ο Στρατός Ξηράς στη Δεκαετία 2021-2030). Ελληνικό Ινστιτούτο Στρατηγικών Μελετών, σσ. 64-85. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/378848610_E_Exelixe_tou_Strategikou_ Dogmatos_tou_NATO_kai_problematismoi_gia_to_mellon

Koukakis, G. (2024). The Greek-Romanian Relations: Background, Current Status and Future Prospects. Geostrategic Pulse, No 294 (January-February 2024), pp. 21–

35. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/378971744_The_Greek- Romanian_Relations_Background_Current_Status_and_Future_Prospects

Koukakis, G. (2024). The European Union Maritime Security Operation ‘EUNAVFOR ASPIDES’ in the North-Western Indian Ocean, the Enhanced Role of the Hellenic Republic (Greece), and the Future of Regional Security in the Indo-Pacific. South and South East Asia Security Research Centre Research Note, 3. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.28083.03363

Koukakis, G. (2024). The First Ever 2024 European Defence Industrial Strategy: Background, Challenges and Future Considerations Regarding the European Security and Defense [Occasional Paper 2/2024]. HERMES Institute of

International Affairs, Security & Geoeconomy. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.27247.44961

Koukakis, G. (2024). The evolution of the European Union Security Strategy: Towards the establishment of a European Army? [Research Paper No.105]. Center for International Strategic Analyses. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.34521.12648

Koukakis, G. (2024). Navigating through the contemporary Mediterranean security landscape. Geostrategic Pulse, No 295 (March-April 2024), pp. 27–39. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/380640148_Navigating_through_the_co ntemporary_Mediterranean_security_landscape

Koukakis, G. (2024). Türkiye’s decision to turn the Orthodox Christian Churches “Hagia Sophia” and “Chora” into Mosques and its influence to the National Security of Greece [Briefing Note No “1/2024”]. HERMES Institute of International Affairs, Security & Geoeconomy. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.33468.86404